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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Julia was twelve years old when she last saw her family.  She was 
walking home from school in Russia when three men abducted her, took her 
to Moscow, and flatly told her she would be engaging in prostitution.  At her 
first attempted escape, one of her abductors slashed her cheek with a knife to 
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let her know that if she failed to cooperate, she would lose her life.  For 
seven years, Julia was raped, subjected to forced labor, and injected with 
drugs on a regular basis.  Julia suffered under those conditions until she was 
nineteen years old, when she finally escaped with the help of an aid agency.1  
Suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,2 Julia could not bear living 
in Russia and used fraudulent papers obtained from a friend to enter the 
United States.  Julia hoped to remain in the United States, fearing that if 
deported to Russia, her abductors would track her down and put her back in 
the brothel, or kill her.3 
Amare was twelve years old when he witnessed his parents being shot 
and killed by gang members burglarizing his house in Ethiopia.  One year 
after Amare moved into an orphanage, he was abducted by armed militia and 
taken to an army base.  The militia told him that they would provide him 
with food and shelter and that he would be helping rid the country of the 
gang responsible for his parents’ murder.  Amare’s captors made him think 
that he was obliged to be a soldier for his own protection.  Amare and his 
peers were first assigned to carry heavy loads, such as ammunition or injured 
soldiers.  When a friend of Amare’s was too weak to carry his load, he was 
shot.  Amare knew that death would be his fate as well if he failed to 
properly follow instructions.  Amare’s duties also included standing guard, 
watching prisoners who were dying of heat and malnutrition, and preventing 
them from escaping.  After four years of subjugating others to tortuous 
conditions against his will, Amare was able to escape when his commanders 
sent him to gather food.  Amare feared being captured and killed or forced to 
return to his former conditions if he stayed in the country, so with the help of 
his cousin in America, he entered the United States.4 
 
 1.  According to Alexander Krasnov of Russia’s Interior Ministry Police, the Russian police “do 
what they can” to fight prostitution by raiding brothels, but are unable to address the root of the 
problem.  Matthew Chance, Russia’s Sex Slave Industry Thrives, Rights Groups Say, CNN WORLD 
(July 18, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/18/russia.prostitution/index.html.  
“[W]e still don’t have a basic law that defines victims’ rights.  At the moment, it’s mostly aid 
agencies that deal with [alleviating the problem of forced prostitution].”  Id. 
 2.  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) results when a person suffers from a traumatic event 
that is outside the realm of typical human experiences.  DAVID KINCHIN, POST TRAUMATIC STRESS 
DISORDER: THE INVISIBLE INJURY 2 (2005).  PTSD can result from a near death experience, as well 
as from sexual abuse.  Id.  PTSD has led to frequent suicide attempts among victims of human 
trafficking.  Jonathan Wald, Sex Slavery: A Family Business, THE CNN FREEDOM PROJECT (Mar. 4, 
2011), http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/04/sex-slavery-a-family-business/. 
 3.  While this description does not represent a specific person, it is a hypothetical situation 
typical of many girls who are victims of human trafficking in Russia and other countries.  See infra 
Part IV. 
 4.  While this description does not represent a specific person, it is a hypothetical situation 
typical of many children in Ethiopia and other countries who are forced to be child soldiers.  See 
infra Part IV. 
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Upon entering the country, Julia and Amare applied for asylum.  United 
States asylum law seeks to prevent the return of undocumented foreign 
nationals to their home countries if doing so may put them in danger of 
being persecuted by their government, or by a source that their government 
is unable or unwilling to control.5  However, under the current law, Julia and 
Amare would likely be deported to their home countries where they endured 
persecution, despite their governments’ inability to protect them.6  In order 
to qualify for asylum, an applicant must show, among other things,7 
persecution on one of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.8  For victims of human 
trafficking and former child soldiers, the only viable ground to claim is that 
they are members of particular social groups.9  In order to qualify as a social 
group, the group must not have been created by its persecutor.10  Victims of 
human trafficking and child soldiers have such labels due to their 
persecutor’s actions; they would not fall under such categories but for their 
persecutors abducting them.  Thus, victims of human trafficking and child 
soldiers may be denied classification as members of particular social groups, 
and consequently, asylum.11 
This Comment explains that under the current case law, “victims of 
human trafficking” and “former child soldiers” are unlikely to be found as 
particular social groups because their persecutors created the groups.12  This 
Comment argues that “women from (a given country)” and “children from (a 
given country)” are valid social groups under which victims of human 
trafficking and child soldiers, respectively, may claim asylum.13  There are 
circuit splits, as well as conflicting holdings within circuits, as to whether 
gender and youth can define social groups.14   In addition to the social group 
obstacle, this Comment explains how child soldiers face the unique barrier 
 
 5.  See infra Part II. 
 6.  See infra Part V. 
 7.  A successful asylum claim requires that the applicant show past persecution, or a well-
founded fear of future persecution, committed by the government or a source that the government is 
unable or unwilling to control.  See infra Part II. 
 8.  See infra Part II. 
 9.  See infra notes 170–71, 227 and accompanying text. 
 10.  Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] social group may not be 
circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution.”).  See also infra Part III for a detailed 
discussion of the requirements for a group to qualify as a social group for purposes of asylum. 
 11.  See infra Part V. 
 12.  See infra Part V. 
 13.  See infra Part VI. 
 14.  See infra Part V. 
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of the persecutor’s bar.15  The persecutor’s bar states that an applicant may 
not be granted asylum if the applicant has persecuted others.16  Until 
recently, judges have applied the persecutor’s bar in denying asylum, 
regardless of whether an applicant’s persecutory acts were made under 
coercion.17  A recent case, Negusie v. Holder,18 may change the direction of 
this law in holding that involuntary persecution may be exempt from the 
persecutor’s bar.19  This Comment argues for a middle ground between pre-
Negusie and post-Negusie law: that coerced persecution is still subject to the 
persecutor’s bar, except as applied towards children.20 
Part II of this Comment summarizes the background of asylum and 
refugee law, the elements required to qualify for asylum, as well as the 
alternatives to asylum.21  Part III details how to determine if a group 
qualifies as a social group.22  Part IV discusses the conditions for victims of 
human trafficking and child soldiers in different countries.23  Part V 
describes the current state of the law in granting asylum to victims of human 
trafficking and former child soldiers and explains the persecutor’s bar.24  
Part VI analyzes options for granting asylum to victims of human trafficking 
and child soldiers.25  It dissects the discrepancies in granting asylum to such 
groups, explains circuit splits, discusses which lines of thought are most 
sound, and explains the impact that Negusie26 has had on the application of 
the persecutor’s bar towards former child soldiers.  It also sets out three 
proposals: for courts to acknowledge “women” as a social group,27 for courts 
to allow “youth” to define a social group,28 and for the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA), upon hearing Negusie on remand, to find that voluntariness 
should not be relevant to the persecutor’s bar as applied to adults, but should 
be a factor when applied to children.29  Part VII considers the impact of the 
proposals that this Comment sets forth and possible repercussions for 
maintaining the status quo.30  Part VIII concludes the Comment.31 
 
 15.  See infra notes 158–266 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See infra notes 158–266 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See infra notes 249–59 and accompanying text. 
 18.  129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009). 
 19.  See infra notes 158–266 and accompanying text. 
 20.  See infra notes 384−399 and accompanying text. 
 21.  See infra notes 32−103 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra notes 104–32 and accompanying text. 
 23.  See infra notes 133–57 and accompanying text. 
 24.  See infra notes 158–280 and accompanying text. 
 25.  See infra notes 281–399 and accompanying text. 
 26.  Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009). 
 27.  See infra notes 281–337 and accompanying text. 
 28.  See infra notes 339–53 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See infra notes 354–400 and accompanying text. 
 30.  See infra notes 400–30 and accompanying text. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:19 PM 
[Vol. 39: 423, 2012] Seeking Asylum 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
427 
II.  ASYLUM AND REFUGEE LAW 
A.  The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
International efforts to help refugees began taking shape at the end of 
World War I.32  After several treaties and organizations formed and were 
then replaced, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) was established in 1951.33  Soon thereafter, the UNHCR 
convened to form a treaty concerning refugees: The 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.34  This treaty defines a 
refugee as a person residing outside his or her country of nationality, who is 
unable or unwilling to return because of a “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.”35  Since the treaty’s adoption, 
approximately seventy-five percent of the world’s countries have signed the 
1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol (collectively, the Convention).36  
Included in the Convention is the doctrine of nonrefoulement,37 forbidding 
states from returning refugees to a country where they may be persecuted on 
account of one of the five protected grounds.38 
In 1967, the United States signed the Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, thereby acceding to the provisions of the Convention.39  However, 
because the Convention is not “self-executing,”40 the United States must 
 
 31.  See infra notes 431–36 and accompanying text. 
 32.  DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 34 (2007). 
 33.  The first High Commissioner for Refugees was appointed in 1921.  Id.  His office assisted 
many groups displaced by World War I in settling abroad.  Id.  Several treaties soon followed, 
providing a framework for international protection for refugees.  Id.  World War II triggered a 
stronger movement; in 1943, the Allies created the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.  Id. 
at 36.  This was followed by the International Refugee Organization in 1947, which was replaced by 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1951.  Id. at 36−37.  Today, 
the UNHCR has over 6000 staff members working in over one hundred countries.  Id. at 38. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 39.  These five grounds will hereinafter be referred to as “the five protected grounds.” 
 36.  Id. at 9. 
 37.  “Refoulement” is a French term referring to the return of refugees to persecution.  Id. at 70. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Robert J. Williams, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council and Its Aftermath: A Problematic Gap 
in International Immigration Law, 9 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 55, 68 (1995). 
 40.  A treaty is “self-executing” when ratification of the treaty alone implements its provisions.  
Id. at 57 n.21 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 155 (1993)). 
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pass legislation in order to give effect to the treaty’s terms.41  When 
Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States came into line 
with the obligations set forth in the substantive provisions of the Convention 
by incorporating its provisions into Congress’s Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA).42  Although there remain subtle differences between the 
provisions in the Convention and those in the INA,43 most of the portions of 
the United States legislation applicable to this Comment are in line with the 
international treaty. 
B.  United States Asylum Provisions 
There are three categories of asylum applicants in the United States: 
those filing affirmative applications,44 those filing defensive applications,45 
and those at ports of entry.46  An immigration judge (IJ) provides the initial 
evaluation of defensive applications for asylum and a second review of 
affirmative applications not granted by asylum officers.47  When an IJ does 
not grant an asylum application, it is appealable to the BIA.48  When the BIA 
rules against a claim, the applicant may appeal the removal order to the 
federal courts of appeal.49 
In order for an applicant to successfully claim asylum, the applicant 
must establish three elements.  First, the applicant must prove either past 
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.50  Second, the 
persecution must have been or is expected to be committed by a proper 
 
 41.  Id.  See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 491 (2008) (“While a treaty may constitute an 
international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes 
implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on 
that basis.”). 
 42.  MARTIN, supra note 32, at 72–73.  The INA was first drafted by the United States Congress 
in 1952.  Id. at 72. 
 43.  Id. at 73. 
 44.  Affirmative applications are filed by those who are not currently in removal proceedings.  
Id. at 79.  When an applicant files an affirmative application, the applicant receives an interview 
with an asylum officer to be conducted in a “nonadversarial” manner.  Id.  Asylum officers grant 
meritorious cases and refer the remaining cases to removal proceedings in immigration court.  Id. 
 45.  An applicant files a defensive application for asylum if removal proceedings are already 
underway.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 78. 
 47.  Id. at 81. 
 48.  Id. at 83.  The BIA is an administrative appeals tribunal and is part of the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review in the Department of Justice.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 85.  A circuit court hearing a case on appeal must accord substantial deference, known 
as Chevron deference, to the BIA’s interpretations of statutes and regulations.  Capric v. Ashcroft, 
355 F.3d 1075, 1085 n.4 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)). 
 50.  Sanz de Santamaria v. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 
208.13(b)(1) (2008)).  See also infra notes 53–67 and accompanying text. 
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source: either the government or forces that the government is unwilling or 
unable to control.51  Lastly, the past or future persecution must have been or 
is expected to be motivated by one of the five protected grounds as a 
“central reason.”52 
Neither the Convention nor the INA have defined the key concept of 
persecution, but the Ninth Circuit has defined it as “the infliction of 
suffering or harm . . . in a way regarded as offensive.”53  If an applicant 
successfully shows past persecution, he or she “creates a rebuttable 
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.”54  The 
government can rebut this presumption if the country’s conditions have 
changed such that it is now safe for the applicant to move back to his home 
country.55  In determining whether an alien has suffered past persecution, the 
immigration judge (IJ) must consider the cumulative effect of the allegedly 
 
 51.  Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000).  See also infra notes 68–70 and 
accompanying text. 
 52.  The five protected grounds are race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and social group.  
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).  See also infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
 53.  MARTIN, supra note 32, at 97.  No subjective intent to harm is required for a finding of 
persecution.  See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The fact that a persecutor 
believes the harm he is inflicting is ‘good for’ his victim does not make it any less painful to the 
victim, or, indeed, remove the conduct from the statutory definition of persecution.”). 
 54.  Sanz de Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1007 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)). 
 55.  Id.  The burden of proof is on the government to rebut the applicant’s presumed well-
founded fear of future persecution by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, either changed 
country conditions, or that the applicant could avoid future persecution by reasonably relocating 
within the country.  Id.; see also MARTIN, supra note 32, at 438.  For the government to show 
changed country conditions, it must conduct an individualized analysis focusing on the specific harm 
inflicted on the applicant and the relevant information contained in the country reports.  Chand v. 
INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000).  General changes within the country are not sufficient.  
Id.; see also Hanna v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2007).  In Hanna, the applicant was a 
citizen of Iraq who, among other incidents, was captured and tortured due to accusations that he was 
anti-government.  Hanna, 506 F.3d at 936.  The BIA held that since Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath 
party were no longer in power, the applicant’s fear of future persecution no longer existed.  Id. at 
937.  When coalition forces took over control of Iraq, the circumstances in the country had changed 
such that the applicant no longer had an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution and was 
rendered ineligible for asylum.  Id.  If a government successfully proves that the applicant can safely 
return to his or her country, the applicant may still be eligible for humanitarian asylum if the asylum 
seeker establishes brutally severe past persecution amounting to a compelling reason to be unwilling 
to return.  Belishta v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2010).  “This avenue for asylum has been reserved for rare situations of 
‘atrocious’ persecution, where the alien establishes that, regardless of any threat of future 
persecution, the circumstances surrounding the past persecution were so unusual and severe that he 
is unable to return to his home country.”  Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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persecutory incidents.56  In the alternative, if the applicant opts to show a 
well-founded fear of future persecution not based on past persecution, he or 
she must demonstrate both subjective and objective components.57  The 
subjective component can be satisfied by the applicant’s credible testimony 
evidencing a genuine fear of persecution.58  Factors that may be considered 
in determining credibility include demeanor,59 responsiveness,60 detail,61 
inconsistencies,62 government reports,63 counterfeit documents,64 and 
 
 56.  Delgado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2007).  Some incidents that have 
been found to individually show past persecution are extreme physical violence, rape, and torture.  
See Chand, 222 F.3d at 1073–74 (“Physical harm has consistently been treated as persecution.”); see 
also Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 57.  Sanz de Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1007 (“The applicant may prove eligibility by 
demonstrating . . . a subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable fear of persecution.”). 
 58.  Id.  Deference is given to an IJ’s credibility determination as he is in the best position to 
assess the trustworthiness of the applicant’s testimony.  Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 661 
(9th Cir. 2003).  The substantial evidence standard is used to review adverse credibility findings.  
Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 59.  Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that applicant “began to 
literally jump around in his seat and to squirm rather uncomfortably while testifying”).  However, 
boilerplate demeanor findings are not appropriate.  Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1048, 
1051–52 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Cookie cutter credibility findings are the antithesis of the individualized 
determination required in asylum cases.”). 
 60.  “To support an adverse credibility determination based on unresponsiveness, the BIA must 
identify . . . instances . . . where the petitioner refused to answer questions.”  Singh v. Ashcroft, 301 
F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 61.  Singh-Kaur, 183 F.3d at 1153.  In Singh-Kaur, an applicant for asylum claimed that, because 
he reported police misconduct to the superintendent of police, officers arrested and tortured him.  Id. 
at 1150–51.  The Ninth Circuit expressed suspicion of the applicant’s testimony because he failed to 
supply details of the events surrounding his arrest.  Id. at 1153.  This lack of detail supported the 
court’s adverse credibility finding and denial of asylum.  Id. 
 62.  Prior to 2005, inconsistencies were sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding only if 
they related to the basis of an applicant’s alleged fear of persecution going to the heart of the asylum 
claim.  Manimbao, 329 F.3d at 660.  With the passing of the Real ID Act in 2005, however, judges 
were given the discretion to find adverse credibility based on inconsistencies that do not relate to the 
heart of the asylum claim.  Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006)).  When adverse credibility is determined based on 
inconsistencies in testimony and documents, an applicant must be given an opportunity to explain 
the discrepancy.  Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999).  If the applicant is not 
given such an opportunity, the adverse credibility finding may be reversed.  Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 
555 F.3d 1089, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 63.  Zheng v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2005).  The IJ must conduct an 
individualized credibility analysis and cannot exclusively rely “on a factually unsupported assertion 
in a State Department report to deem [an applicant] not credible.”  Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1069 
(9th Cir. 2000).  Courts also may not infer adverse credibility merely because the events an applicant 
relates are not described in a State Department document.  Id.  “Credible testimony by itself is 
sufficient to support an asylum claim.”  Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 64.  Use of counterfeit documents is a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility finding only if it 
goes the heart of the asylum claim.  Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he fact 
that an asylum seeker . . . used false passports . . . without more, is not a proper basis for finding her 
not credible.”), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, as 
recognized in Singh v. Holder, 602 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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voluntary return to the country from which the applicant seeks asylum.65  
The objective component requires a showing that the applicant “‘has a good 
reason to fear future persecution.’”66  “Because asylum is a discretionary 
form of relief, the standard for objective reasonableness is fairly low: Even a 
ten percent chance of future persecution may establish a well-founded 
fear.”67 
For persecution to be committed by a proper source, it must be 
committed by the government or a source that the government is either 
unable or unwilling to control.68  Determining whether a persecutor qualifies 
as one that the government is unable or unwilling to control is a difficult 
task.69  Courts often look at whether the applicant reported persecutory 
 
 65.  See Loho v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1016, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2008).  In Loho, a citizen of 
Indonesia applied for asylum based on her claim that indigenous Indonesians persecuted her due to 
her race and religion.  Id. at 1017.  The applicant testified that she visited the United States twice 
during the period of her alleged persecution, and voluntarily returned to Indonesia without seeking to 
remain in the United States.  Id.  The applicant explained that she failed to attempt to seek asylum 
because “the time was so short and [she] didn’t know about asylum.”  Id.  The IJ, BIA, and Ninth 
Circuit agreed that the applicant’s failure to apply for asylum while in the United States, despite the 
severe mistreatment she claimed to have suffered in Indonesia, made her not credible.  Id.  The Ninth 
Circuit denied her asylum application based in part on this adverse credibility finding.  Id. at 1018. 
 66.  Ruiz v. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 
257 F.3d 1262, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001)).  The applicant can satisfy the objective prong “by adducing 
credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fear of 
persecution.”  Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 
179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)), overruled on other grounds by Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 
1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009).  An applicant may demonstrate a reasonable fear of persecution by 
showing that he or she has been targeted for persecution.  See, e.g., Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 
1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that death threats were sufficient to establish a well-founded 
fear).  Violence towards an applicant’s family may also establish a well-founded fear.  Korablina v. 
INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 1998).  An applicant may also satisfy the objective prong by 
evidencing that there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution against people similarly situated.  8 
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A) (2010); see also, e.g., Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (finding that a pattern and practice of the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Serbs satisfied the 
objective prong).  The Ninth Circuit has also implemented a “disfavored group analysis,” in which 
the court looks at two factors: the persecution suffered by a group of which the applicant is a 
member and the applicant’s individualized risk.  Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 
2009).  The more severe the group’s persecution is, the less evidence the applicant must proffer of 
individually specific targeting.  Id. 
 67.  Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1052–53 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987)). 
 68.  Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000).  See also MARTIN, supra note 32, at 
117 (“U.S. law has readily accepted that harm or threats from non-state actors can give rise to a valid 
basis for asylum.” (citing Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International 
Protection from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 106–
09 (1999)). 
 69.  MARTIN, supra note 32, at 118.  No country can guarantee protection from criminal activity, 
and not all criminals qualify as persecutors whom the government is unable or unwilling to control.  
Id. 
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incidents to the government and whether the government took any action 
beyond writing a police report.70 
Finally, the applicant must show that the past persecution he or she 
suffered, or the future persecution he or she fears, is motivated by at least 
one of the five protected grounds as a “central reason.”71  The five protected 
grounds are: race,72 religion,73 ethnicity,74 political opinion,75 and 
membership in a particular social group.76  Even if an applicant satisfies 
every element required for asylum, a judge must deny his or her claim if the 
applicant falls under one of several categories of exclusion.77 
The categories of exclusion mandate denial to applicants who fail to 
promptly file for asylum,78 applicants who have committed “a particularly 
 
 70.  Id.  See also Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that after the applicant 
reported several assaults and threats to the police, along with the perpetrators’ identifications, the 
court found that the “failure by the authorities to protect [the applicant] and his family clearly 
indicate[d] that the police either could not or would not control the [group] who threatened [the 
applicant] and his family”). 
 71.  See supra note 52.  If a non-governmental actor is responsible for the persecution, and 
targets its victims for reasons related to the five protected grounds, the requirement that the 
persecution be motivated by one of these grounds is established, even if the absence of governmental 
protection was not motivated by one of the grounds.  Guidelines on International Protection: The 
Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Being Trafficked, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
372, 383 (2007) [hereinafter Guidelines on Trafficking].  This element is also established in the 
alternative situation when the persecution is inflicted by a non-governmental actor and is not 
motivated by one of the five protected grounds, but the government’s inaction is motivated by one of 
the protected grounds.  Id. 
 72.  The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) and its inclusion of “race” as a protected ground appears to refer to “ethnic 
groups identifiable by their shared culture as much as by any physical distinctiveness.”  MARTIN, 
supra note 32, at 230.  Race can include “‘color, descent, or national or ethnic origin.’”  Id. 
 73.  There are two ways that a persecutor can target members of a particular religion: either by 
attacking a group with a particular religious identification, regardless of whether particular members 
are nonbelievers, or by attacking targets exhibiting religious practices and beliefs.  Id. at 239. 
 74.  The ethnicity ground is also referred to as “nationality” and can be described as a group 
whose members have the same citizenship as those persecuting them, “but who belong to a different 
linguistic or political community.”  Id. at 231.  The line between race and ethnicity are often blurred.  
Id. 
 75.  The “classic” political opinion claim involves an applicant who was a recognizable political 
dissident (for example, one who participated in political demonstrations).  Id. at 191.  The late 
twentieth century saw a growth of armed insurrections and civil wars that brought with them new 
legal challenges for political asylum applicants.  Id.  The difficulty with fitting the new cases in the 
existing paradigm involved neutrality and imputed political opinion.  Id.  Neutrality amounts to 
political opinion if the persecutors impute political opposition to those claiming to be neutral.  Id. at 
199. 
 76.  See infra Part III. 
 77.  See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
 78.  An applicant must apply for asylum within a year of arrival to the United States unless he or 
she demonstrates extraordinary circumstances or a material change in circumstances.  Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
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serious crime,”79 applicants who have committed a serious nonpolitical 
crime prior to arrival in the United States,80 applicants who are reasonably 
believed to pose a danger to the United States,81 applicants who have 
participated in or provided funding for terrorism,82 applicants who have 
firmly resettled in another country,83 applicants who can be safely removed 
to a third country,84 and applicants who fall under the persecutor’s bar.85 
C.  Alternatives to Asylum 
If an immigrant fails to qualify for asylum, his or her application is 
automatically considered for three alternative forms of relief: withholding of 
removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and 
humanitarian asylum.86  While withholding of removal grants immigrants 
the right to not be removed to their country of origin, it offers fewer benefits 
than asylum.87  Withholding of removal is subject to the same bars as 
 
 79.  Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 80.  Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1995).  An applicant may not be granted asylum 
if “there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime 
outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).  The judge is not required to balance the degree of persecution feared 
against the seriousness of the offense.  See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 432 (1999). 
 81.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2006). 
 82.  Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).  The statute “imposes a two-part analysis: (1) whether an alien 
engaged in a terrorist activity, and (2) whether there are not reasonable grounds to believe that the 
alien is a danger to the security of the United States.”  Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848, 855–56 
(9th Cir. 2004).  For a definition of qualifying terrorist activity, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006). 
 83.  An applicant can be denied asylum if he or she had been offered permanent residency in 
another country in which he inhabited prior to arrival to the United States.  Yang v. INS, 79 F.3d 
932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2) (1996)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006). 
 84.  An applicant falls under this bar if he or she may be removed to another country, pursuant to 
a bilateral agreement with the country, where his life or freedom would not be threatened on account 
of one of the five protected grounds.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 85.  An applicant falls under the persecutor’s bar if the applicant has engaged in the persecution 
of another, motivated by one of the five protected grounds.  See infra notes 244–47 and 
accompanying text.  To be barred, the person must have “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
participated in the persecution” of another on account of one of the five grounds.  8 U.S.C. §§ 
1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 86.  See generally Dree K. Collopy, Incorporating a Hardship Factor in Asylum Claims Based 
on Female Genital Mutilation: A Legislative Solution to Protect the Best Interests of Children, 21 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 469, 477−95 (2007). 
 87.  See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1999) (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 
407, 429−30 (1984)).  If an applicant is granted withholding of removal, he or she may still be 
removed to any other country in which he does face a risk of persecution.  El Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 
F.3d 932, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2004).  Unlike a successful asylum applicant, who may apply for 
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asylum,88 less the one year rule89 and the firm resettlement bar.90  In order to 
qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate that it is 
“more likely than not” that the applicant would be subject to persecution if 
returned to his or her country.91  As in asylum, the fear of persecution must 
be due to one of the five protected grounds.92 
To be eligible for relief under CAT, an applicant must establish that if 
sent to the proposed country of removal, the applicant “is more likely than 
not to suffer intentionally-inflicted [torture amounting to] cruel and inhuman 
treatment.”93  If an applicant successfully meets his or her burden of proof, 
 
permanent U.S. residency after one year, a person granted withholding of removal cannot do so.  
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 n.6 (1987).  Furthermore, if an applicant is granted 
asylum, his immediate family members are granted derivative asylum.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) 
(2006).  However, if an applicant is granted withholding of removal, the applicant’s family members 
have no such right.  Compare id. (granting derivative asylum for spouses and children of successful 
asylum applicants), with id. § 1231(b)(3) (failing to give derivative protection to family members of 
those with withholding of removal). 
 88.  See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
 89.  El Himri, 378 F.3d at 937 (explaining that withholding of removal has no statutory time 
limit). 
 90.  Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d 1030, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 91.  Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001).  In Al-Harbi, the applicant claimed 
asylum from Iraq based on a fear of future persecution due to his opposition of Saddam Hussein.  Id. 
at 886.  In analyzing the application for withholding of removal, the court noted that “[t]he record 
contain[ed] detailed and extensive support, entirely independent of Al-Harbi’s own testimony, 
demonstrating that if Petitioner were returned to Iraq years after participating in the American airlift 
of Iraqi dissidents to Guam, he would likely be punished as a traitor.”  Id. at 892.  Compiling this 
with other evidence, the court concluded that “no reasonable person could conclude other than that 
Petitioner would likely be persecuted upon return to Iraq.”  Id. at 893.  The applicant met his burden 
of proof that he would be subjected to persecution more likely than not upon return to Iraq, and was 
therefore granted withholding of removal.  Id. at 894.  Note that the standard for withholding of 
removal is higher than that for asylum.  An applicant may be granted asylum if there is even only a 
ten percent chance of being persecuted, while an applicant may only attain withholding of removal if 
he can show more than a fifty percent chance of persecution.  See supra text accompanying note 67.  
Because withholding of removal has the additional burden of proving future persecution as “more 
likely than not,” it differs from asylum in that it is mandatory, not discretionary.  Al-Harbi, 242 F.3d 
at 888.  Similar to asylum, the possibility of persecution for withholding of removal can be shown 
with either past persecution or fear of future persecution.  Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 
(9th Cir. 2009).  Also like asylum, the fear of future persecution must satisfy the objective and 
subjective prongs.  Id.; see also supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text (describing the objective 
and subjective prongs).  The government may rebut the showing of a fear of future persecution by 
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a fundamental change of 
circumstances or that the applicant can safely relocate within his country.  8 C.F.R. § 
1208.16(b)(1)(i)−(ii) (2010). 
 92.  Al-Harbi, 242 F.3d at 888.  The five protected grounds are race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, and membership in a particular social group.  See supra notes 72–76 and 
accompanying text. 
 93.  Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005).  The CAT, to which the United 
States is a signatory, forbids governments from returning a person to a country in which he may be 
tortured.  See Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001).  Note that torture is an extreme 
concept that requires a higher showing than persecution.  The required threat of torture is defined as: 
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the applicant is entitled to a mandatory granting relief under CAT, which 
affords him or her the same protection as withholding of removal.94  CAT 
relief does not impose the same bars as asylum or the general provision of 
withholding of removal.95  In addition, to be eligible for CAT relief, an 
applicant need not show that he or she would be targeted on account of one 
of the five protected grounds as he or she would for asylum or withholding 
of removal.96 
If an applicant is unable to attain protection under the aforementioned 
forms of relief, due to a category of exclusion or the rebuttal of fear of future 
persecution, the applicant may qualify for humanitarian asylum.97  
Humanitarian asylum may be granted to an applicant if he or she provides 
“compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country 
[designated for removal] arising out of the severity of the past 
persecution.”98  The applicant’s past persecution must have been atrocious 
 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. 
Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2000)).  All 
evidence pertaining to the possibility of torture must be considered, including evidence of flagrant 
violations of human rights within the country of removal.  Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1068 (citing 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) (2009)).  The applicant’s testimony may be sufficient to sustain the burden of 
proof without corroboration if it is deemed credible.  Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1282 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(2)−(3) (2000)).  In evaluating the possibility of future torture, the court may examine 
whether the applicant could safely relocate to another part of the country of removal.  Id.  (citing 8 
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2000)).  To qualify for relief under CAT, the torture must be “inflicted by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in 
an official capacity.”  Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 
208.18(a)(1) (2002)).  “Acquiescence” by the government does not require willful acceptance; 
awareness and willful blindness by governmental officials is sufficient.  Id. at 1197. 
 94.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2010). 
 95.  The only qualification to the mandatory granting of CAT is if the applicant has committed a 
“particularly serious crime” or an aggravated felony for which the penalty is at least five years.  
Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1216 n.4 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(d), 1208.17 (2010)). 
 96.  Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1283; see also Stephen Knight, Asylum from Trafficking: A Failure 
of Protection, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 9 (July 2007), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ 
documents/cgrs/advisories/Knight_%20ImmigBriefings_Trafficking_Asylum.pdf.  See supra notes 
72–76 for an explanation of the five protected grounds. 
 97.  Brucaj v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2004).  Even if an applicant is eligible for 
humanitarian asylum, a judge may deny such asylum under his discretion.  Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 
700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)−(b) (2006)).  Such a denial, however, may not be 
arbitrary or capricious.  See Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1329 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 98.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A)−(B) (2010).  See also Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 
71, at 377–78. 
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enough to cause him or her to experience “ongoing traumatic psychological 
effects which would render return to the country of origin intolerable.”99  It 
may be said that the impact of the persecution on the individual continues.100  
Like asylum and withholding of removal, humanitarian asylum requires 
persecution on account of one of the five protected grounds.101  Therefore, 
unless an applicant is successful in attaining relief under CAT, his remaining 
options require establishing persecution on account of one of the five 
protected grounds.102  For victims of human trafficking and former child 
soldiers, the likeliest ground upon which to claim relief is membership in a 
particular social group.103 
III.  MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
In order to qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that the 
persecution he or she fears is motivated, at least in part, by one of five 
grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group.104  If an applicant applies for protection as a member 
of a particular social group, he or she must satisfy three requirements: “(1) 
the applicant must identify a group that constitutes a ‘particular social 
group;’ (2) the applicant must establish that s/he is a member of that group; 
and (3) the applicant must show that s/he was persecuted based on that 
 
 99.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 378.  Humanitarian asylum is “reserved for rare 
situations of ‘atrocious’ persecution, where the alien establishes that, regardless of any threat of 
future persecution, the circumstances surrounding the past persecution were so unusual and severe 
that he is unable to return to his home country.”  Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 
1999).  Humanitarian asylum is generally restricted to those who have endured such extreme past 
experiences as “torture, extended imprisonment or repeated physical abuse, usually at the hands of 
totalitarian regimes.”  Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 576 (7th Cir. 2008).  See also, e.g., 
Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 1997) (listing “German Jews, the victims of the Chinese 
‘Cultural Revolution’ . . . [and] survivors of the Cambodian genocide” as groups who may qualify 
for humanitarian asylum).  In Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2001), an applicant was 
found eligible for humanitarian asylum after having been arrested, detained three times, beaten, 
tortured, forced to drink urine, slashed with knives, forced to eat meat against his religious beliefs, 
burned with cigarettes, and forced to watch the sexual assault of his wife. 
 100.  Lal, 255 F.3d at 1009.  The BIA has denied humanitarian asylum to applicants because of 
“the lack of evidence of severe psychological trauma stemming from the harm” they suffered in their 
native countries.  See, e.g., In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 326 (B.I.A. 1998).  See also infra 
note 270 and accompanying text.  Conversely, in In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 20 (B.I.A. 1989), 
the BIA granted humanitarian asylum to an applicant who, because of the persecution he suffered, 
was “physically debilitated, [required to] wear a hearing aid due to his head injury, [was] always 
anxious and fearful, and [was] often suicidal.” 
 101.  Ghotra v. Gonzales, 179 F. App’x 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 102.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 103.  See infra notes 171, 227 and accompanying text. 
 104.  See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
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membership.”105  Of the five protected grounds, membership in a particular 
social group has been the most debated.106  The number of attempts to define 
this phrase has increased dramatically during the past decade.107  “[T]he 
‘statutory language standing alone is not very instructive’ and . . . ‘in its 
broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost completely open-ended.’”108 
The seminal decision defining the term “social group” is Matter of 
Acosta, in which the BIA defined the term as a group with a “common, 
immutable characteristic” that the members “either cannot change, or should 
not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual 
identities or conscience.”109  While all circuits embrace the Acosta 
standard,110 the Ninth Circuit has added an alternative way to establish the 
existence of a social group: the “voluntary associational” characteristic 
analysis.111  This method defines a social group as a group whose members 
are “closely affiliated with each other,” and “are actuated by some common 
impulse or interest.”112  A social group may exist when there is a “voluntary 
associational relationship among the purported members, which imparts 
some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a 
member of that discrete social group.”113  The BIA has explicitly rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach.114  The BIA has explained “that Acosta does not 
require ‘a voluntary associational relationship among group members’ nor 
does it require an element of ‘cohesiveness or homogeneity among group 
members.’”115  The BIA focuses instead on the group’s visibility: the extent 
 
 105.  Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2003).  When a circuit court is hearing a 
case appealed from the BIA, the analysis of whether a group constitutes a social group for purposes 
of asylum is reviewed de novo as it is a question of law.  Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (citing Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 106.  Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular 
Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 48 (2008). 
 107.  MARTIN, supra note 32, at 255. 
 108.  Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 170–71 (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 109.  In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); see also Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 
1092–93 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 110.  Marouf, supra note 106, at 53. 
 111.  Id. at 53 n.25 (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)) (italics 
omitted). 
 112.  Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. 
 113.  Marouf, supra note 106, at 53 n.25. 
 114.  In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 115.  Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. at 956–57).  The Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged that the BIA does not require a 
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to which society members perceive those with the characteristic in question 
as members of a social group.116  The BIA explains that the inclusion of the 
social group category as one of the five protected grounds “was not meant to 
be a ‘catch all’ applicable to all persons fearing persecution.”117 
All courts, however, have agreed that a social group cannot be defined 
by the fact that it has been targeted for persecution.118  In other words, if the 
applicant seeks to establish past persecution, the social group must have 
existed before the persecution began; the group cannot have been created by 
the alleged underlying persecution.119  As a matter of logic, “motivation 
must precede action; and the social group must exist prior to the persecution 
if membership in the group is to motivate the persecution.”120  As described 
in Lukwago v. Ashcroft: 
[A] “particular social group” must exist independently of the 
persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum.  Although the 
shared experience of enduring past persecution may, under some 
circumstances, support defining a “particular social group” for 
purposes of fear of future persecution, it does not support defining a 
“particular social group” for past persecution because the 
persecution must have been “on account of” a protected ground.121 
Accordingly, if an applicant can show a fear of future persecution, 
beyond that presumed by a showing of past persecution, and this fear of 
 
“voluntary associational relationship,” and recognized that some social groups are not comprised of 
members who associate by choice.  Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010).  The 
Ninth Circuit therefore developed a two-pronged approach to determine whether a group constitutes 
a social group.  Id. (citing Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000)).  “[A] 
‘particular social group’ is one united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or 
by an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that 
members either cannot or should not be required to change it.”  Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 
1093. 
 116.  In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959–60.  The Seventh Circuit has rejected the BIA’s visibility 
requirement.  See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Ramos v. Holder, 589 
F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 117.  In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960.  See also Guidelines on International Protection: 
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 
(May 7, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html [hereinafter Guidelines: Membership of a 
Particular Social Group]. 
 118.  In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956 (citing Guidelines: Membership of a Particular Social 
Group, supra note 117, ¶ 14). 
 119.  Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003).  See generally Immigration and 
Nationality Act, §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208(b), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b) (2006); 
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2010). 
 120.  Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen., 322 F. App’x 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 121.  Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 172 (citing INA § 101(a)(42)(A)). 
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future persecution is motivated by a label he gained as a result of past 
persecution, then persecutory acts may define such a social group.122 
The characteristic defining the members of the group may be an innate 
one, such as kinship ties, or may be a shared past experience, such as former 
military leadership or land ownership.123  Large, internally diverse 
demographic groups rarely constitute social groups.124  In addition, a social 
group must be described with sufficient particularity.125  Examples of groups 
that have been found to qualify as “particular social groups” include 
families,126 homosexuals,127 transgender individuals,128 and those with a 
 
 122.  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 345–47 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Gomez-Zuluaga, an 
applicant sought protection based on a fear of future persecution motivated by her membership in a 
particular social group.  Id. at 345.  The group she proposed described women who were abducted 
and subjected to involuntary servitude and who subsequently escaped.  Id.  The court held that 
because this group was created by persecution, and that the applicant could not be labeled as a part 
of this group until after her persecution began, her past persecution could not have been motivated 
by her membership in the group.  Id. at 346.  However, it could be a valid social group for purposes 
of fear of future persecution.  Id. at 345–46.  “Because this group is based in part on events that 
happened in the past, it is effectively a ‘status or condition’ that is sufficiently immutable to be 
considered a particular social group.”  Id. at 345.  “[W]hile clearly related to the [abductor’s] past 
mistreatment of numerous individuals, it exists independently of the persecution that Petitioner fears 
that she will suffer in the future as a member of this particular social group.”  Id. at 345−46 
(emphasis added).  The applicant’s escapee status is what would motivate the abductors to persecute 
her in the future.  Id. at 346.  “Unlike in the past persecution context, her escapee status has already 
attached, and a fortiori will have existed before any future persecution occurs.”  Id. 
 123.  Marouf, supra note 106, at 52 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006)). 
 124.  See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1572, 1576–77 (9th Cir. 1986).  See also Pedro-
Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Kanjobal Indians comprising a 
large percentage of the population in a given area is not a particular social group). 
 125.  Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App’x 956, 958 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that a social 
group must “be defined with sufficient particularity to avoid indeterminacy”) (citing Scatambuli v. 
Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009)).  See also In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 
2006) (holding that “noncriminal informants” is a group “too loosely defined to meet the 
requirement of particularity”).  A group is not defined with sufficient particularity if it is “too 
amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for determining group membership.”  In re A-M-E & 
J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007).  For example, “the wealthy” fails the particularity 
requirement because the characteristic of wealth is too subjective to define a social group: 
 Depending upon one’s perspective, the wealthy may be limited to the very top echelon; 
but a more expansive view might include small business owners and others living a 
relatively comfortable existence in a generally impoverished country.  Because the 
concept of wealth is so indeterminate, the proposed group could vary from as little as 1 
percent to as much as 20 percent of the population, or more. 
Id. 
 126.  Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576–77 (discussing that a family is a “prototypical example” 
of a particular social group); but see Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“[T]he concept of persecution of a social group [does not include] the persecution of a 
family . . . .”).  Note that if an applicant’s claimed social group is his family, and if he has family 
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status based on former occupations.129  Examples of groups that have been 
found not to qualify as social groups include government informants,130 
young men targeted for gang recruitment but who refused to join,131 and 
persons of low economic status.132 
IV.  DEFINING VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND CHILD SOLDIERS 
A.  Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking is prohibited by international law and criminalized in 
a growing number of nations.133  Nevertheless, trafficking in persons is 
rampant.134  Human trafficking is one of the largest illegal trades in the 
world, second only to drugs trafficking, and is predicted to become the 
largest illegal trade within five years.135  The primary goal of human 
trafficking is to profit through the exploitation of human beings136 who are 
 
members with continuing safety in his hometown, this may lead the judge to discount the applicant’s 
well-founded fear.  Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 127.  Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 128.  Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other 
grounds by Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 129.  See Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 232 F.3d 1024, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that people who 
are persecuted because of their status as a former police or military officer may constitute a social 
group but that current police or military are not a social group); but see Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 
937 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining to find former servicemen in the Guatemalan military a 
particular social group). 
 130.  Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 131.  Barrios v. Holder, 567 F.3d 451, 456 (9th Cir. 2009); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 
858–62 (9th Cir. 2009).  See also Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 744–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that 
young Salvadoran men who resist gang violence is not a social group because it lacks both 
particularity and social visibility). 
 132.  Li v. INS, 92 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that people of low economic status in 
China do not constitute a particular social group). 
 133.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 372. 
 134.  The United States Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report estimates that 
800,000 people are trafficked across international borders every year, and that between four and 
twenty-seven million are subject to modern-day slavery.  Polaris Project, Human Trafficking 
Statistics, http://www.cicatelli.org/titleX/downloadable/Human%20Trafficking%20Statistics.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Polaris Project].  Romania has become a major transit for 
selling people into Europe from destinations as far-reaching as Honduras, Afghanistan, the Congo, 
and China.  David Batstone, Romania A Global Center For Human Trafficking, CNN OPINION (Feb. 
17, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/07/batstone.romania.sex.trade/index.html.  
Romania offers “a strategic geographic location” as a connector between the East and West, which 
makes it “a source, transit and destination country for the people trade.”  Id.  When Romania was 
admitted to the European Union in 2007, relaxed border regulations enhanced its attraction for 
international human traffickers, heightening the problem.  Id. 
 135.  Wald, supra note 2. 
 136.  Id.  It has been reported that on average, each “forced-laborer” generates $13,000 per year.  
Polaris Project, supra note 134. 
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often abducted, raped, beaten, sold into brothels, and forced into 
prostitution.137  Victims are often told that if they attempt to escape, they or 
their family members will be killed.138  While trafficking usually involves 
women being forced into the sex trade, it is not limited to such.139  The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states: 
Trafficking in persons—also known as “human trafficking”—is a 
form of modern-day slavery.  Traffickers often prey on individuals 
who are poor, frequently unemployed or underemployed, and who 
may lack access to social safety nets, predominantly women and 
children in certain countries.  Victims are often lured with false 
promises of good jobs and better lives, and then forced to work 
under brutal and inhuman conditions . . . . [Trafficking includes] sex 
trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, 
or coercion or in which the person induced to perform such an act is 
under 18 years of age. . . . [It also includes] the recruitment, 
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for 
labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion, for 
the purpose of subjecting that person to involuntary servitude, 
peonage, debt bondage, or slavery . . . . Trafficking can also take 
place in labor situations such as domestic servitude, labor in a 
prison-like factory, or migrant agricultural work.140 
In all forms of trafficking, victims are treated as merchandise, “owned” 
by their traffickers, with virtually no regard for their human rights and 
dignity.141  Traffickers often torture their victims when they do not produce 
enough money.142  Once a victim is abducted, she is often moved to a place 
where there is a market for her services; this is often a place in which she 
 
 137.  Knight, supra note 96, at 1. 
 138.  Nilaj v. Gonzales, 205 F. App’x 902, 904 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Immigration Remedies for Trafficking Victims, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1270569897006.shtm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).  In 
determining whether something falls under the definition of trafficking, we look not only at the type 
of work victims are made to do, but also examine the use of force, fraud, or coercion to obtain that 
work.  Id.  The only exception not requiring any of these is the use of minors for commercial sexual 
activity.  Id.  Trafficking also often involves the removal of organs.  Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 335 
(2004). 
 141.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 373. 
 142.  Wald, supra note 2. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:19 PM 
 
442 
lacks language skills and other basic knowledge that would enable her to 
seek help.143 
B.  Child Soldiers 
A child soldier is “any person below the age of 18 who is a member of 
or attached to . . . armed forces.”144  Within the past decade, hundreds of 
thousands of children have been killed while fighting in conflicts around the 
world.145  Child soldiers are “forced to engage in hazardous activities such as 
laying mines or explosives” and using weapons.146  These children usually 
“live under harsh conditions with insufficient food and little or no access to” 
medical care.147  Child soldiers are often brutally beaten and subjected to 
humiliation.148  These children suffer severe punishments if they do not 
follow their superior’s instructions perfectly or try to escape.149   
Several factors contribute to the frequency with which children are 
becoming soldiers.150  In countries suffering widespread destruction due to 
war, families are frequently torn apart and children are left orphaned.151  
Often, these children’s only source of security, food, medicine, and 
protection is the armed forces.152  The armed forces prey on children’s 
 
 143.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 376. 
 144.  Child Soldiers Global Report 2008: Methodology, Terms, and Definitions, COALITION TO 
STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/appendices/ 
methodology-terms-and-definitions (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 145.  Child Soldiers, CHILD SOLDIERS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.child-
soldiers.org/childsoldiers/child-soldiers (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Child Soldiers].  The 
problem is worst in Africa, where children as young as nine are recruited to participate in armed 
conflicts.  Some Facts, CHILD SOLDIERS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.child-soldiers.org/ 
childsoldiers/some-facts (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Some Facts].  Child soldiers are also 
prevalent in various Asian countries as well as parts of Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East.  
Id. 
 146.  Child Soldiers, supra note 145.  See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 
(Aug. 26, 1996), http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/Doc51.htm [hereinafter Promotion and 
Protection]. 
 147.  Child Soldiers, supra note 145. 
 148.  Id.  Girl soldiers are especially “at risk of rape, sexual harassment, and abuse” in addition to 
“being involved in combat and other tasks.”  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  The increased use of child soldiers may be due to the emergence of “new wars” involving 
fragmented armies, a proliferation of weapons, and increased involvement of civilian fighters.  
Timothy Webster, Babes with Arms: International Law and Child Soldiers, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 227, 232 (2007). 
 151.  Some Facts, supra note 145. 
 152.  See id.  While many children allegedly enlist “voluntarily,” they often have few alternatives.  
Id.  Some children join to survive “in war-torn regions after family, social, and economic structures 
collapse.”  Id.  They also often join after watching their families tortured or “killed by government 
forces or armed groups.”  Id.  Some enlist due to “poverty and lack of work or educational 
opportunities.”  Id.  Some children witness the shooting of family members who refuse to join, and 
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vulnerability to recruit them and train them to commit horrific acts.153  “The 
children witness other children who are unwilling to comply being killed and 
often feel they have no choice but to commit the acts that their superiors 
order them to carry out.”154  Some children are told that if they do not follow 
instructions, their parents will be killed.155  The United States and forty-four 
other countries have recognized the prevalence of child soldier recruitment 
and have dedicated themselves to bringing an end to the use of child 
soldiers.156  Despite international recognition of the importance of ending the 
suffering caused by human trafficking and the use of child soldiers, the 
current state of asylum law as applied to these applicants is in contrast with 
these needs.157 
V.  CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A.   The Ability of Victims of Human Trafficking to Attain Asylum Under the 
Current State of the Law  
Although “trafficking” is defined differently among nations, each 
country has a duty to protect and assist trafficking victims.158  In addition, 
the UNHCR has a duty to ensure that victims of trafficking, who fear being 
persecuted if returned to their country, shall not be returned to that 
country.159  In 2000, the United Nations finalized a new international law on 
 
join as their only alternative to the same fate.  Voices of Young Soldiers, CHILD SOLDIERS 
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/voices-of-young-soldiers (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Voices of Young Soldiers]. 
 153.  Dani Cepernich, Fighting for Asylum: A Statutory Exception to Relevant Bars for Former 
Child Soldiers, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2010). 
 154.  Id. at 1115. 
 155.  Voices of Young Soldiers, supra note 152. 
 156.  Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1100.  Forty-five countries, including the United States, are 
parties to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (Optional Protocol).  Id.  These countries have committed themselves to 
taking “all feasible measures to . . . accord to [persons recruited or used contrary to the protocol] all 
appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.”  
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-conflict.htm. 
 157.  See infra notes 391–96 and accompanying text. 
 158.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 373. 
 159.  See id. at 374.  In addition, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness require nations to avoid actions that 
would result in statelessness.  Id. at 386−87.  Countries are explicitly forbidden from depriving 
nationality if doing so would result in statelessness.  Id. at 387.  A stateless person is defined as 
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trafficking: the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (The Palermo Protocol).160  The 
United States also established domestic anti-trafficking legislation known as 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA).161  The TVPA 
seeks to affect anti-trafficking policy abroad by authorizing the President to 
withdraw U.S. assistance from countries that fail to sufficiently comply with 
the U.S. government’s “‘minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking.’”162  In addition, the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services issue “T Nonimmigrant Status Visas” (T visas) to allow victims of 
human trafficking to remain in the United States if they assist in an 
investigation or prosecution of human trafficking.163  While Congress has 
allocated up to five thousand T visas to be issued annually, the government 
has issued less than one thousand per year since their implementation.164  
However, given that between 14,500 and 17,500 foreign nationals are 
trafficked into the United States every year, T visas alone are not sufficient 
to address the veracity of the problem in the United States.165  Victims of 
human trafficking whom the aforementioned regulations fail to protect may 
 
somebody who is denied citizenship under the laws of any nation.  Id.  When addressing the 
situation of a trafficking victim, it is important to keep the implications of statelessness in mind.  Id.  
The mere fact than an asylum applicant is a trafficking victim will not render her stateless per se.  Id.  
A trafficking victim continues to possess the citizenship she enjoyed before being abducted.  Id.  
However, an applicant may be unable to prove citizenship if her abductors confiscated her identity 
documents, which they often do.  Id.  While the victim is rendered unable to prove her identity, it is 
often only temporary and may be easily overcome with the assistance of the applicant’s country of 
origin.  Id. 
 160.  Janie Chuang, The United States As Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat 
Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 438 (2006). 
 161.  Id. at 439. 
 162.  Id. (quoting Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386 § 108(a)). 
 163.  United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Victims of Human Trafficking: T 
Nonimmigrant Status, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a 
7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=02ed3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=02ed
3e4d77d73210VgnVM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).  In order to be eligible 
for a T visa, an applicant must (1) be a victim of human trafficking, (2) be in the United States, 
American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or at a port of entry due to 
trafficking, (3) comply with requests from a law enforcement agency to assist in the investigating of 
human trafficking (or is under the age of eighteen, or unable to cooperate due to physical or 
psychological trauma), (4) demonstrate that she would endure tremendous hardship if removed from 
the United States, and (5) be admissible to the United States.  Id.  T visas are issued for three years, 
after which the holder is eligible to adjust status to permanent residency.  T-1 Visas for Victims of 
Human Trafficking, THE ANSARI LAW FIRM, PLLC: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW,  
http://www.ansarilawfirm.com/index.cfm/hurl/obj=365/TVisasforVictimsofHumanTraffickingAusti
nimmigrationandvisaattorney.cfm (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). 
 164.  Katherine Kaufka, T Nonimmigrant Visas and Protection and Relief for Victims of Human 
Trafficking: A Practitioner’s Guide, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, n.8 (June 2006). 
 165.  Polaris Project, supra note 134. 
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seek to find refuge under asylum.166  To be granted asylum, the victim must 
fall within the definition of “refugee,” a hard task for most victims to 
accomplish.167 
Assuming the applicant is found credible and does not encounter 
evidentiary problems, a victim of human trafficking typically has little 
trouble proving that her abduction and trafficking amounts to persecution.168  
In addition, a victim of human trafficking does not encounter greater 
obstacles than most other asylum applicants in proving that her persecution 
was carried out by the government or an agent that the government is 
unwilling or unable to control.169  The fundamental obstacle that victims of 
human trafficking encounter lies in the third requirement of an asylum 
claim: the persecution must be motivated by one of the five protected 
grounds.170  Unless an applicant can show that she was targeted on the basis 
 
 166.  There are different instances in which a victim of human trafficking would apply for asylum: 
the victim may have been trafficked abroad and escaped, or trafficked within national territory, 
escaped, and fled abroad in search of international protection.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 
71, at 337. 
 167.  Id. at 373.  Not all victims or potential victims of trafficking fall within the scope of the 
refugee definition.  Id. at 374.  The Convention defines a refugee as a person residing outside his or 
her country of nationality, who is unable or unwilling to return because of a “well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.”  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 168.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 377 (“Persecution can be considered to involve 
serious human rights violations, including a threat to life or freedom, as well as other kinds of 
serious harm or intolerable predicament, as assessed in the light of the opinions, feelings and 
psychological make-up of the asylum applicant.”).  See also supra notes 53–56 and accompanying 
text.  The evolution of international law in criminalizing trafficking has made it easier to determine 
whether an act of trafficking amounts to persecution.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 
377.  Trafficking inherently involves “serious violations of human rights which will generally 
amount to persecution.”  Id.  See also supra notes 133–43 and accompanying text.  In addition, if an 
applicant is able to prove that she will be reprised or re-trafficked upon return to her country, such 
actions would also usually amount to persecution.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 379. 
 169.  See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (describing the requirement that persecution 
must have been inflicted by the government or a source that the government is unable or unwilling to 
control).  See also Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 380 (explaining that both 
governmental and non-governmental actors may qualify as persecutors within the refugee 
definition).  Many countries have failed to implement measures to prevent trafficking.  Id. at 381.  
The “mere existence” of a law that prohibits human trafficking is insufficient unless it is effectively 
implemented.  Id.  Even if a country implements mechanisms to protect victims of trafficking, if the 
applicant has been unable to afford herself of the protections of such mechanisms, the country may 
be deemed unable to protect the victim.  Id.  Note that even when a victim is trafficked outside of the 
country of abduction, and is mainly exploited outside the country of origin, the victim may still have 
a well-founded fear of persecution in their original country.  Id. 
 170.  See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (describing that persecution must be 
motivated by one of five protected grounds).  See also Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 
383 (“In relation to asylum claims involving trafficking, the difficult issue for a decision-maker is 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:19 PM 
 
446 
of her race, religion, political opinion, or nationality, the likeliest ground for 
a victim of human trafficking to attain asylum is that of membership in a 
particular social group.171 
Victims of human trafficking have two viable social groups to claim 
membership in, both with separate inherent obstacles: “victims of human 
trafficking”172 or “females173 in (a given country).”174  Case law has been 
bleak as to whether “victims of human trafficking” may constitute a social 
group.175  A group titled as such fails the requirement that the group must 
exist before the persecution began; the social group “cannot be defined 
exclusively by the fact that it is targeted for persecution.”176  A victim of 
human trafficking, by definition, is not such until after she is trafficked.  
Consequently, an applicant cannot be granted asylum based on past 
persecution motivated by her membership in the group of “victims of human 
trafficking” because membership in that group does not occur until after the 
persecution occurs.177  While a social group defined by past persecution 
cannot be the motivating ground for that past persecution, it can be the 
motivating ground for a fear of future persecution.178  Consequently, an 
applicant can only be granted protection as a member of the group “victims 
of human trafficking” if she can prove a fear of future persecution 
independent from that presumed by a showing of past persecution.179  The 
future persecution feared must be motivated by the applicant’s status as a 
victim of prior persecution; prior persecution alone is insufficient to 
establish this.180 
 
likely to be linking the well-founded fear of persecution to a [protected] ground.”).  “Central to the 
dispute over the applicability of refugee law to trafficking victims is the question of the link, or 
‘nexus’” between the persecution and one of the five protected grounds.  Knight, supra note 96, at 3.  
Human trafficking is a commercial enterprise and is primarily motivated by profit rather than 
persecution on a ground under the Convention.  Id. at 8.  “Immigration judges (IJs) and the BIA 
most frequently treat the claims of women refugees fleeing trafficking as victims of personal, 
criminal problems, and thus as ineligible for asylum for failure to demonstrate any link to any of the 
five statutory grounds.”  Id. at 6. 
 171.  Knight, supra note 96, at 3. 
 172.  The application of the phrase “victims of human trafficking” as used in this Comment 
encompasses all similar definitions, such as “former victims of human trafficking” or “former forced 
prostitutes.” 
 173.  While not all victims of human trafficking are females, this Comment will focus on their 
claims, as they are predominantly targeted.  See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 174.  See infra notes 176–94 and accompanying text. 
 175.  See infra notes 176–94 and accompanying text. 
 176.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 177.  See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
 178.  See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
 179.  Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen., 322 F. App’x 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 180.  See id. at 143.  See also supra note 122, and infra note 187 and accompanying text 
(describing cases in which an applicant’s past persecution defined the grounds for her feared future 
persecution).  The future persecution that the applicant fears may be in a number of forms in addition 
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The Third Circuit’s Sarkisian v. Attorney General181 opinion discusses 
two cases where applicants established valid social groups defined by past 
persecution for the purpose of establishing a fear of future persecution: 
Lukwago v. Ashcroft,182 and Gomez-Zuluaga v. Attorney General.183  In both 
cases, the applicants presented evidence that previously persecuted members 
of their group were subject to repeated persecution.184  In Lukwago, the 
applicant presented evidence that the persecuting party he escaped from 
“exacted retribution for escape, killing escaped children to punish them or to 
make an example of them.”185  Likewise, in Gomez-Zuluaga, the applicant 
established that the persecuting party she escaped from had killed escaped 
members of her family and others who had escaped.186  Sarkisian found it 
dispositive that in both cases, the “killings were retribution for escape.”  The 
court explained that:  
The fact of past persecution in these cases was relevant not merely 
because the applicants were persecuted, their persecutors knew who 
they were, or their persecutors might persecute them again.  Rather, 
these applicants presented evidence showing their persecutors 
would retaliate because of their escape, an experience shared with 
other escapees, or at least that the escape was one central reason for 
persecution.187 
The applicant in Sarkisian was denied asylum because, unlike the applicants 
in Lukwago and Gomez-Suluaga, this applicant did not explain “how her 
past persecution [would] motivate her abductors to target her.”188 
If an applicant alternatively seeks to define her social group as “females 
in (her specified country),” she avoids violating the rule that prohibits 
groups created by their persecutors but encounters the obstacle that, 
 
to reprisals for having escaped, or repeated trafficking.  See Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 
71, at 378−79.  A victim who is returned to her country may experience severe discrimination and be 
ostracized because she was raped.  Knight, supra note 96, at 5.  Such ostracism may itself be serious 
enough to constitute persecution.  Id.  “Where the individual fears such treatment, her or his fear of 
persecution is distinct from, but no less valid than, the fear of persecution resulting from the 
continued exposure to the violence involved in trafficking scenarios.”  Id. at 4. 
 181.  322 F. App’x 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 182.  329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 183.  527 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2008). 
  184.  Sarkisian, 322 F. App’x at 142. 
 185.  Id. at 143 (citing Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 179–80). 
 186.  Id. (citing Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 347). 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
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according to some circuits, a social group cannot be too broad.189  The BIA 
has not specifically addressed in a precedential decision whether females, 
without any defining characteristics other than their nationality, may 
constitute a social group.190  The BIA has, however, recognized women who 
belong to a particular tribe as a social group.191  Immigration judges and 
federal circuit courts have varied as to their determination of whether gender 
is too broad to define a social group.192  In Kuci v. Attorney General, the 
Third Circuit found that a group entitled “young women who have been 
approached or threatened with kidnapping, forced [prostitution] or killing by 
human traffickers” was too broad to be a social group.193  The finding that 
this group was “too broad and too generalized”194 to constitute a social group 
shows that this court would hold the even broader category of “females” to 
also not constitute a social group.  Similarly, in Rreshpja v. Gonzales,195 the 
Sixth Circuit held that a group defined as “young, attractive Albanian 
women” may not constitute a social group because it is too broad.196  In 
Gomez v. INS,197 the Second Circuit found that “women from El Salvador” 
did not compromise a social group because “a broadly based characteristic” 
such as gender cannot define a social group.198  There have also been several 
 
 189.  See supra note 124, and infra notes 193–208 and accompanying text. 
 190.  Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010).  See also Gerald Seipp, A Year in 
Review: Social Visibility Doctrine Still Alive, but Questioned, 87 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1417, 
1423 (July 19, 2010). 
 191.  See In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 192.  See infra notes 193–208 and accompanying text. 
 193.  299 F. App’x 168, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2008).  In this case, individuals known for trafficking 
women attempted to kidnap the asylum applicant twice.  Id.  The kidnappers threatened her, saying 
“this is not the end of it.”  Id.  The Third Circuit found that the social group “was too broad because 
it was based solely on . . . the person’s gender and contact, no matter how minimal and apparently, 
without regard to any particular age, with human traffickers.”  Id.  While the court found that the 
attempted abductions were sufficient to amount to persecution, it maintained that the “particular 
social group” was not cognizable under INA § 101(a)(42)(A).  Id. at 170. 
 194.  Kuci, 299 F. App’x at 170.  The court also supported its denial of asylum by relying on the 
decision in Lukwago, holding “that the ‘particular social group’ must exist independently of the 
persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum.”  Id.  The court, however, failed to examine the 
difference between applying this notion towards claims based on past persecution and claims based 
on future persecution.  See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text (describing the distinction). 
 195.  420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 196.  Id. (noting that allowing such a social group would allow “virtually any young Albanian 
woman who possesses the subjective criterion of being ‘attractive’ [to] . . . be eligible for asylum in 
the United States.”).  The court also noted that “Albanian women who are forced into prostitution” 
could not be a social group because a social group cannot be defined by the fact that it suffered 
persecution.  Id. at 555–56.  As the Third Circuit did in Kuci, the court here also failed to discuss that 
this could constitute a social group for purposes of establishing a fear of future persecution.  See 
Knight, supra note 96, at 10–11. 
 197.  947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 198.  Id. at 664.  In Gomez, the applicant had been raped and beaten in El Salvador on five 
separate occasions, during which guerillas threatened to kill her.  Id. at 662. 
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instances where immigration judges have denied social group status to 
females.199 
On the other hand, some circuits have noted that gender can define a 
social group.  In Mohammed v. Gonzales,200 the Ninth Circuit stated that 
females of a particular nationality, “or even in some circumstances females 
in general,” may constitute a social group.201  The court further stated that 
“‘U.S. law is unfortunately under-developed in th[e] area’ of gender 
persecution,”202 but the fact that gender can constitute a social group is 
“simply a logical application of our law.”203  The Ninth Circuit continued 
that it would be difficult to argue “that sex or gender, combined with . . . 
nationality” does not fall under the social group definition set forth in Acosta 
because gender is in fact an innate characteristic fundamental to individual 
identity.204  The Eighth Circuit followed the reasoning in Mohammed and 
found that “Somali females” constitute a particular social group.205  The 
 
 199.  In one case an IJ found that gender did not constitute a social group where a young Albanian 
woman was kidnapped while walking down the street.  Knight, supra note 96, at 7.  After being 
repeatedly raped for a week, she was put in a boat to be taken to Italy for prostitution.  Id.  When the 
boat was apprehended by authorities, the victim was freed and went home where she received 
several threatening phone calls.  Id.  After fleeing to the United States and applying for asylum, the 
IJ found her testimony credible, but denied her application because her persecution was not related 
to one of the five protected grounds; the kidnappers “did not target [her] for any purpose other than 
for their own criminal enrichment.”  Id.  The court found her to have been “randomly targeted . . . 
for no other reason than her location at that particular moment, her gender, and her age . . . [and not] 
on account of one of the Act’s enumerated grounds,” implying that gender did not constitute a 
ground.  Id.; see also infra notes 327–31 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ use of criminal 
intent as a grounds for denying asylum). 
  In another case involving a young Albanian woman, the applicant was repeatedly approached 
by men who told her she could earn money “‘the easy way,’” and was heckled and chased.  Knight, 
supra note 96, at 7–8.  At one point, men from the same group surrounded her with four cars, but she 
managed to escape.  Id.  The IJ stated that the evidence “strongly demonstrates that Albania 
currently has an overwhelming problem with the trafficking of women” and referenced reports by 
the U.S. State Department demonstrating that 30,000 Albanian woman were employed in 
prostitution abroad.  Id. at 8.  Despite the overwhelming evidence that women in Albania were often 
trafficked, the IJ denied asylum, attributing the persecution to criminal violence rather than 
persecution motivated by one of the five grounds.  Id.  In another case of a young Albanian woman, 
an IJ noted that “kidnapping of women for the purposes of trafficking in prostitution is a fairly 
common event in Albania,” but the social group of “Albanian women” is too broadly defined.  Id. at 
9. 
 200.  400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 201.  Id. at 797. 
  202.  Id. at 797 n.17 (quoting DEBORAH ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 
367 (3d ed. 1999)). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797.  See also supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 205.  Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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Tenth Circuit has similarly held that gender can constitute a social group.206  
The Sixth Circuit has also agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s finding.207  In 
addition to circuit splits, there has even been disagreement within individual 
circuits as to the appropriateness of defining a social group based on 
gender.208  Ultimately, the determination of whether gender may define a 
social group rests on the circuit in which the case sits and in some circuits, 
even the applicant’s turn of luck as to the majority’s opinion. 
One recent Ninth Circuit case, however, shows hope of the BIA 
affirmatively determining that gender may define a social group.  In 
Perdomo v. Holder,209 the applicant sought asylum based on her fear of 
persecution as a member of the social group, “women between the ages of 
fourteen and forty” in Guatemala.210  The IJ and BIA denied her application, 
“finding that a social group consisting of ‘all women in Guatemala’ is over-
broad and ‘a mere demographic division of the population rather than a 
particular social group.’”211  The Ninth Circuit heard the case on appeal and 
remanded it.212  It first struck down the BIA’s contention that the gender-
 
 206.  Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1198–200 (10th Cir. 2005) (requiring either gender or 
membership in a tribe to identify a social group). 
 207.  Diallo v. Mukasey, 268 F. App’x 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Because these opinions 
followed Acosta, as the Sixth Circuit does, I find them particularly persuasive.”).  In this case, the 
Sixth Circuit found that one’s gender coupled with their membership in a specific ethnic group 
constitutes a social group.  Id. 
 208.  In the Third Circuit there have been conflicting answers as to whether gender may define a 
social group.  Compare Kuci, 299 F. App’x at 169–70 (finding that a group defined by a person’s 
gender is too broad to constitute a social group), with Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 
1993) (finding that “women from Iran” can constitute a social group, citing that the BIA in Acosta 
“specifically mentioned ‘sex’ as an innate characteristic that could link the members of a “‘particular 
social group’”).  The Ninth Circuit has also had contradictory holdings.  Compare Mohammed v. 
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that females of a particular nationality “or even 
in some circumstances females in general” may constitute a social group), with Sanchez-Trujillo v. 
INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576–77 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing that neither “males taller than six feet” nor 
“young, working class, urban males of military age” may constitute social groups, even if such 
individuals were at greater risk of persecution than the general population).  The court held as such 
because they are broad, “sweeping demographic division[s] [that] naturally manifest a plethora of 
different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings.”  Sanchez-
Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.  The court described “that to recognize any person who might 
conceivably establish that he was a member of this class is entitled to asylum or withholding of 
deportation would render the definition of ‘refugee’ meaningless.”  Id. 
 209.  611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 210.  Id. at 664.  Perdomo claimed that women in Guatemala were murdered at a high rate with 
impunity.  Id. at 663.  The applicant submitted several reports by the U.S.-based Guatemala Human 
Rights Commission.  Id. at 664.  These reports documented “the torture and killing of women, the 
brutality of the killings, the non-responsiveness of the Guatemalan government to such atrocities, the 
countrywide prevalence of the killings, and the lack of explanation for the killings.”  Id.  The 
applicant had not been persecuted in the past; her claim was based on a fear of future persecution.  
Id. 
 211.  Id. at 663. 
 212.  Id. at 669. 
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defined social group is too internally diverse to be recognized.213  The court 
then explained that to deny a social group merely because it is broad is 
“inconsistent with [BIA] precedent and [the Ninth Circuit’s] case law.”214  
The court “rejected the notion that a persecuted group may simply represent 
too large a portion of a population to allow its members to qualify for 
asylum.”215  The court explained that in the instances in which social groups 
were denied as too broad, “[t]here [was] no unifying relationship or 
characteristic to narrow th[e] diverse and disconnected group.”216  The court 
distinguished such cases with the proposed group of “women in (a given 
country),” citing precedent that “gender is an ‘innate characteristic’ that is 
‘fundamental to [one’s] identit[y].’”217  The court pointed out that the BIA 
failed to take into consideration that such an “innate characteristic may be 
the basis for a protected social group.”218  The Ninth Circuit did not make a 
conclusive determination as to whether “women in (a given country)” may 
constitute a social group and the BIA has yet to hear the case on remand.219 
Some courts have noted that the question regarding gender-related 
claims should not be whether gender constitutes a social group, but whether 
the group members are sufficiently likely to be targeted such that they could 
be said to be persecuted “on account of” their gender.220  In one case, the 
 
 213.  Id. at 666 (explaining that the BIA does not require strict homogeneity in social groups).  
The court cited cases in which the Ninth Circuit found valid such “internally diverse social groups as 
homosexuals and Gypsies.”  Id. at 668.  The court cited Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “all alien homosexuals are members of a ‘particular social group’”) and 
Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “[t]here is no question that 
Gypsies are an identifiable ethnic group and that being a Gypsy is a protected ground [for asylum]”).  
Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668. 
 214.  Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 664. 
 215.  Id. at 669 (citing Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996)).  See also infra note 298 
for an analysis of Singh. 
 216.  Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668 (quoting Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 
2005)).  The court discussed Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010), in 
which the proposed social group of “returning Mexicans from the United States” was too broad 
because its members did not share a voluntary relationship or an innate characteristic.  Perdomo, 611 
F.3d at 668. 
 217.  Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 667 (quoting Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 
2005)). 
 218.  Id. at 668. 
 219.  Id. at 669 (remanding the case for the BIA to determine, “in the first instance” whether 
women comprise a social group). 
 220.  See, e.g., Valle-Montes v. Att’y Gen., 342 F. App’x 854, 857 (3d Cir. 2009); Gao v. 
Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Keisler v. Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801 
(2007); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199−200 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A) (2006)). 
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Third Circuit found that an applicant’s persecution was not motivated by her 
gender, noting that her father suffered from the same attack that she did.221  
The Third Circuit found in another case that an applicant was not kidnapped 
on account of her membership in the social group of “young, female 
students” because evidence showed that kidnappings in her country were 
widespread and that members of this group were no more likely to be 
targeted than any other member of society.222  Other courts look at the 
prevalence of persecution towards the group to determine if membership in 
the group is the motivation for the persecution.223  The prevalence of 
persecution towards a group is “a relevant factor in determining the visibility 
of a group in a particular society.”224  As the fate of victims of human 
trafficking who seek asylum under the social group of “women from (a 
given country)” is unsettled, so too is that of former child soldiers. 
B.  Former Child Soldiers 
As a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, the United States has an 
obligation to take “‘all feasible measures to . . . accord to [persons within its 
jurisdiction recruited or used contrary to the protocol] all appropriate 
assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social 
reintegration.’”225  Because of developmental reasons, children are not 
expected to present testimony to support their asylum claims with the same 
precision as adults and are held to less stringent requirements during the 
adjudication of their claims.226  Nevertheless, child soldiers encounter two 
 
 221.  Valle-Montes, 342 F. App’x at 857. 
 222.  Nicolas v. Att’y Gen., 379 F. App’x 229, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 223.  See, e.g., Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[A] factfinder could 
reasonably conclude that all Somali females have a well-founded fear of persecution based solely on 
gender given the prevalence of [female genital mutilation].”). 
 224.  In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) (citing Guidelines: Membership of a 
Particular Social Group, supra note 117, ¶ 14). 
 225.  Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1100 (quoting Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, art. 6, ¶ 3, 
Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-conflict.htm) (brackets 
in original).  See also supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 226.  Benjamin Ruesch, Open the Golden Door: Practical Solutions for Child-Soldiers Seeking 
Asylum in the United States, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 184, 190 (2008).  A child asylum seeker need 
not prove that he sought the protection of the government in the country in which he was persecuted.  
Id.  In addition, an adjudicator must give a child the benefit of the doubt when determining the 
credibility of his testimony.  Id. at 191 (citing Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 2004)).  
This particularly benefits a child soldier who, while describing the grave conditions that he was 
forced to endure, fails to maintain eye contact with the adjudicator.  Id.  However, child asylum 
applicants may encounter greater obstacles with the passage of the Real ID Act in 2005.  Id. 
(referencing Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 231, 306–
09 (2005)).  The Real ID Act allows an adjudicator to demand corroboration of an applicant’s 
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main obstacles when applying for asylum: establishing membership under 
one of the five protected grounds, and overcoming the persecutor’s bar.  
Unless an applicant can show that he was targeted on the basis of race, 
religion, political opinion, or nationality, the likeliest ground for a child 
soldier to attain asylum is that of membership in a particular social group.227 
Similar to victims of human trafficking, case law has been unclear as to 
whether child soldiers qualify as a social group.  There are two possible 
social groups for child soldiers to claim membership in, neither of which are 
easy to apply: “former child soldiers” and “children in (a given country).”228  
Under current case law, “former child soldiers” generally cannot constitute a 
social group unless they can prove a fear of future persecution beyond that 
presumed from a showing of past persecution.229  Similar to a group defined 
as “victims of human trafficking,” a group defined as “former child soldiers” 
fails the requirement that the social group “cannot be defined exclusively by 
the fact that it is targeted for persecution.”230  Consequently, an applicant 
cannot be granted asylum based on past persecution motivated by 
membership in the group of “former child soldiers” because membership in 
that group does not occur until after the persecution occurs.231  While past 
persecution cannot define the social group for the purpose of establishing a 
motivating ground for that past persecution, such actions can define a social 
group for the purpose of establishing a ground for fear of future 
persecution.232  Therefore, an applicant can only be granted protection as a 
member of the group “former child soldiers” if the applicant proves a fear of 
future persecution independent from that presumed by a showing of past 
 
testimony.  Id. (citing Real ID Act, § 101(a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 231, 303).  If an applicant fails to 
provide such, the adjudicator may deem him not credible and deny his application.  Id. at 191.  
While an adjudicator is still required to give a child the benefit of the doubt, misapplications of the 
Real ID Act continue to lead to improper denials.  Id. at 192. 
 227.  See supra notes 71–76 (describing that persecution must be motivated by one of five 
grounds).  See also Martha Drane, Note, Street Children as Unaccompanied Minors with Specialized 
Needs: Deserving Recognition as a Particular Social Group, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 909, 921 (2010) 
(“With regard to the five groups an asylum claim can be based on, a street child will most likely 
attempt to argue that ‘street children’ constitute a ‘particular social group.’”).  See also Wendy 
Perlmutter, An Application of Refugee Law to Child Soldiers, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 137, 139 
(2001) (“Child soldiers would most likely prove claims of persecution on account of membership in 
a particular social group.”). 
 228.  See infra notes 229–42 and accompanying text. 
 229.  See infra notes 230–33 and accompanying text. 
 230.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 231.  See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
 232.  See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
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persecution.233  To do this, the applicant must produce evidence that 
persecutors target individuals who are former child soldiers as retaliation for 
escape.234 
If an applicant alternatively seeks to define the social group as “children 
in (their specified country),” another obstacle arises: some courts have held 
that a social group cannot be excessively broad.235  Courts tend to deny 
social group status to youth because such a group fails the social visibility 
and particularity requirements.236  The Ninth Circuit has held that “the class 
of young, working class, urban males of military age” is too broad to 
constitute a social group, and would therefore likely strike down the 
possibility of the even broader description, “young.”237  The Second Circuit 
has also held that a “broadly-based characteristic[] such as youth” cannot 
define a social group.238  The Third Circuit has similarly held that “youth” is 
“far too vague and all encompassing” to qualify as a social group.239  The 
Fourth Circuit refused to grant social group status to “adolescents in El 
 
 233.  See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.  See also Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen., 322 F. 
App’x 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 234.  See supra notes 178–87.  For an example of a case in which a former child soldier was able 
to show that he would be persecuted on account of his status as an escaped soldier, see supra note 
180 and accompanying text. 
 235.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 237–40 and accompanying 
text. 
 236.  See infra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.  The Third Circuit has also added that 
“children” may not constitute a social group because, “unlike innate characteristics, such as sex or 
color, age changes over time, possibly lessening its role in personal identity.”  Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 
329 F.3d 157, 171 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 237.  Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576–77 (9th Cir. 1986).  The Ninth Circuit 
described that such a group: 
[D]oes not exemplify the type of “social group” for which the immigration laws provide 
protection from persecution.  Individuals falling within the parameters of this sweeping 
demographic division naturally manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying 
interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings.  As the IJ said in his written 
decision, “This [class of young, working class, urban males] may be so broad and 
encompass so many variables that to recognize any person who might conceivably 
establish that he was a member of this class is entitled to asylum or withholding of 
deportation would render the definition of ‘refugee’ meaningless.” 
   In sum, such an all-encompassing grouping as the petitioners identify simply is not 
that type of cohesive, homogeneous group to which we believe the term “particular social 
group” was intended to apply. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 238.  Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 239.  Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005).  In Escobar, the applicant had been 
a street child in Honduras since the age of nine.  Id. at 364–68.  Having been physically abused by 
gangs, and realizing that the police refused to protect him, he eventually fled to the United States.  
Id.  His application for asylum rested on issues of poverty, homelessness, and youth.  Id.  The Third 
Circuit determined that such issues existed throughout the world, and it was therefore impossible to 
distinguish the applicant from children in similar conditions in other countries.  Id.  The court held 
that such universal conditions could not support his claim, and denied the group recognition as a 
social group.  Id. 
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Salvador who refuse to join the gangs of that country because of their 
opposition to the gangs’ violent and criminal activities,” not only because 
such a group is too broad, but also because it is “ill-defined.”240  Few cases 
suggest that “youth” is sufficient to characterize a group as a social group.  
In In re Kasinga, the BIA found that young women in the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu Tribe constituted a social group.241  Although the factors of gender 
and opposition to the practice of female genital mutilation confounded the 
issues, the BIA “found youth to be an integral component in defining her 
particular social group.”242  It should be noted that most, if not all, denials on 
the ground of breadth concerned groups defined with vague terms such as 
“youth” or “adolescents” rather than a specific age range.243 
If a former child soldier is deemed eligible for asylum—whether by the 
recognition of children as a social group, or by his membership in the social 
group of “former child soldiers,” coupled with a showing of fear of future 
persecution—he is still not free from obstacles.  As previously mentioned, 
the INA includes a persecutor’s bar, stating that if an applicant inflicted 
persecutory acts on another, he is ineligible for asylum.244  To be barred, this 
person must have “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
 
 240.  Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App’x 956, 958 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 241.  See Drane, supra note 227, at 929–30.  This tribe practiced female genital mutilation, a 
practice which the applicant, a young woman, strongly opposed.  Id.  The applicant feared returning 
to her home country due to the possibility of being subjected to such an invasive act.  Id. 
 242.  Id. (quoting Laura P. Wexler, Note, Street Children and U.S. Immigration Law: What 
Should Be Done?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 545, 563 (2008)).  The court held so despite the fact that 
the applicant will eventually “age out” of her youth status.  Id.  The BIA’s decision in In re Kasinga 
has been read to imply that because young women from a specific tribe who oppose genital 
mutilation qualify as a social group, child soldiers may constitute a social group with a similar 
definition: 
[The definition given in In re Kasinga] includes gender (women), a general age group 
(young), a particular tribe, a physical characteristic (not had FGM), and a political view 
(oppose FGM). The specificity of this definition indicates that a similarly narrow 
definition would be used for child soldiers.  The relevant social group could be defined 
as, children under age 18 who have performed the duties of soldiers and who oppose 
performing such duties . . . [with the addition of a] distinction based on nationality or 
geographic location. 
Perlmutter, supra note 227, at 139.  Such a conclusion, however, is unfounded because it fails to 
recognize that to define a social group with the past experience of having been forced to “perform 
the duties of soldiers” in effect defines the social group based on its past persecution, an illegitimate 
description.  See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text. 
 243.  See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text. 
 244.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1101(a)(42) (2006).  This persecutor’s bar applies to asylum 
and withholding of removal, but does not disqualify an applicant from receiving protection under 
CAT.  Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1160 (2009). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:19 PM 
 
456 
persecution” of another on account of one of the five protected grounds.245  
To determine whether an applicant’s acts constitute persecution, the court 
must engage in “a particularized evaluation of both personal involvement 
and purposeful assistance in order to ascertain culpability.”246  Self-
defensive acts do not constitute persecution.247  If a court finds that an 
applicant persecuted others on account of a protected ground, the burden 
shifts to the applicant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he did not.248  If the applicant claims to have engaged in persecutory 
actions due to coercion inflicted upon him, he raises an issue over which 
there is currently much debate. 
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Fedorenko v. United States249 and 
addressed the relevance of duress in applying the persecutor’s bar.  The 
Supreme Court held the bar to apply regardless of the voluntariness of the 
person’s action.250  It would apply even if he claimed to have been forced 
into service as a prisoner of war and would be executed if he tried to 
escape.251  The bar discussed in Fedorenko, however, did not address the 
persecutor’s bar from asylum; it addressed a persecutor’s bar from 
protection under the Displaced Persons Act (DPA), an Act put in place to 
assist refugees from Europe who were driven out of their homelands by 
 
 245.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).  In determining what constitutes such assistance, courts 
have looked at the interpretation of similar statutes for guidance.  See, e.g., Laipenieks v. INS, 750 
F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1985) and concluding that the 
applicant did not assist or participate in the persecution of others based on political opinions); 
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981) (interpreting a similar statute and 
explaining that cutting the hair of inmates before they were executed would not constitute 
persecution, but shooting at escaping inmates would qualify as persecution). 
 246.  Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2006).  The court must examine whether 
the applicant’s assistance was material by measuring “the degree of relation his acts had to the 
persecution itself” by asking such questions as: “How instrumental to the persecutory end were those 
acts?  Did the acts further the persecution, or were they tangential to it?”  Id. at 928.  In Alvarado, 
the applicant served as a military interpreter during the interrogation and torture of suspects.  Id.  
The court held that this constituted persecution of others due to the integral role it played in the 
persecution.  Id. at 929–30.  “This standard does not require actual ‘trigger-pulling’. . . but ‘[m]ere 
acquiescence or membership in an organization,’ is insufficient to satisfy the persecutor exception.”  
Id. at 927 (quoting Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)). 
 247.  Vukmirovic, 362 F.3d at 1252 (“[To hold] that acts of true self-defense qualify as 
persecution would run afoul of the ‘on account of’ requirement in the provision.  It would also be 
contrary to the purpose of the statute.”). 
 248.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(c)(2)(ii), 208.16(d)(2) (2010).  See also Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 930.  
An applicant may rebut the presumption by evidencing that his actions were part of legitimate 
criminal prosecutions and that they were unrelated to any of the five protected grounds.  Id. 
 249.  449 U.S. 490 (1981). 
  250.  Id. at 511–12. 
 251.  Karl Goodman, Negusie v. Holder: The End of the Strict Liability Persecutor Bar?, 13 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 143, 143–44 (2009). 
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World War II.252  Despite this distinction, Fedorenko has been treated as a 
landmark case for the asylum persecutor’s bar, requiring its application to 
those who persecuted others, whether they did so voluntarily or under 
duress.253 
A recent Supreme Court case, Negusie v. Holder,254 may change the 
applicability of Fedorenko to asylum cases.  In Negusie, an asylum applicant 
claimed to have been forced to be a prison guard at a camp where he knew 
the prisoners were being persecuted.255  The immigration judge denied 
 
 252.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490.  The DPA was put into effect in 1948, and enabled such 
refugees “to emigrate to the United States without regard to traditional immigration quotas.”  Id.  
The DPA specifically excluded persons who had assisted in the persecution of civilians.  Id.  The 
petitioner in Fedorenko was serving in the Russian army when he was captured by the Germans.  Id.  
The Germans assigned him to a Nazi concentration camp in Poland, where he served as a guard.  Id. 
at 494.  The district court had described this concentration camp as a “human abattoir” where several 
hundred thousand Jewish civilians were murdered.  Id.  At trial, six witnesses were survivors of this 
camp and claimed that they had “seen petitioner commit specific acts of violence against inmates of 
the camp.”  Id. at 498.  The petitioner claimed that, having been forced to serve as a guard, he had no 
“personal involvement in the atrocities committed at the camp.”  Id. at 491.  The Court found that 
the plain language of the DPA, requiring exclusion of those who “assisted the enemy in persecuting 
civil[ians]” mandated a literal interpretation, such that “an individual’s service as a concentration 
camp armed guard⎯whether voluntary or involuntary” barred him from the benefits afforded to 
refugees by the DPA.  Id. at 491–92. 
 253.  See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that personal 
motivation is irrelevant to a determination of persecution of others).  See also Cepernich, supra note 
153, at 1118.  While, until recently, no court questioned whether Fedorenko was controlling over 
asylum cases, one case, Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2001), has proven to be an outlier 
in holding that Fedorenko allows for the interpretation that a coercion exception to the persecutor’s 
bar may apply.  See id. at 814.  This is the only case that has read Fedorenko to mean that duress 
may remove an applicant from under the persecutor’s bar.  Consequently, Judge Clarence Arlen 
Beam filed a dissenting opinion against this finding.  Id. at 815 (Beam, J., dissenting).  A thorough 
reading of Fedorenko clearly illustrates that voluntariness is not relevant when applying the 
persecutor’s bar.  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 (holding that “the deliberate omission of the word 
‘voluntary’ from [the statute] compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in 
the persecution of civilians ineligible . . . .”).  Whether Fedorenko applies to asylum cases, however, 
is a debatable question.  See infra notes 353–99 and accompanying text. 
 254.  129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009). 
 255.  Id. at 1162–63.  In Negusie, Eritrean state officials took custody of the applicant and forced 
him to perform hard labor.  Id. at 1162.  He was also forced to work as a prison guard for four years.  
Id.  The Court noted that it was “undisputed that the prisoners he guarded were being persecuted on 
account of [one of the five] protected ground[s].”  Id.  The applicant testified that he had: 
[C]arried a gun, guarded the gate to prevent escape, and kept prisoners from taking 
showers and obtaining fresh air.  He also guarded prisoners to make sure they stayed in 
the sun, which he knew was a form of punishment.  He saw at least one man die after 
being in the sun for more than two hours.  Petitioner testified that he had not shot at or 
directly punished any prisoner and that he helped prisoners on various occasions. 
Id. at 1162–63.  The applicant managed to escape from the prison and fled to the United States.  Id. 
at 1163. 
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asylum to the applicant on the ground, in line with Fedorenko, that the 
persecutor’s bar applies even to those whose actions were coerced and 
involuntary.256  The BIA affirmed the ruling of the IJ on the same grounds.257  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision, following the same 
reasoning.258  The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court, which held 
that the BIA and Fifth Circuit misapplied Fedorenko.259  The Court noted 
that the statute in Fedorenko and the one applicable to asylum reflect 
principles that differ in significant respects.260  The Court highlighted that 
because Fedorenko addressed a different statute, enacted for a different 
purpose,261 it is not controlling over the BIA’s interpretation of the 
persecutor’s bar as applied toward asylum applicants.262  The Court pointed 
out that the BIA’s decision should not be accorded Chevron deference263 
because such deference is only accorded when an agency has “exercised its 
interpretive authority,” which the BIA had not.264  Rather, the Court 
explained that the BIA determined that voluntariness is not relevant in 
applying the persecutor’s bar based on a mistaken assumption that 
Fedorenko controls.265  The Court concluded that because the BIA 
incorrectly applied Fedorenko, the case must be remanded to the BIA to 
 
 256.  Id.  After finding that the applicant was for the most part credible, the IJ concluded that 
petitioner’s work as an armed guard constituted persecution.  Id.  The IJ explained that despite the 
lack of evidence that the applicant was malicious or that he was an aggressive person who mistreated 
the prisoners, “the very fact that he helped [the government] in the prison compound where he had 
reason to know that they were persecuted constitutes” persecution, barring him from asylum and 
withholding of removal.  Id.  The IJ, however, granted the applicant CAT relief because he was 
likely to be tortured upon return to Eritrea.  Id.  See also supra notes 93−96 and accompanying text 
(describing the provisions of CAT). 
 257.  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1163.  The BIA repeated that the fact that the applicant “was 
compelled to participate as a prison guard, and may not have actively tortured or mistreated anyone, 
is immaterial.”  Id.  The BIA described that “an alien’s motivation and intent are irrelevant to the 
issue of whether he ‘assisted’ in persecution.”  Id.  The court may only analyze “the objective effect 
of an alien’s actions.”  Id.  The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s grant of CAT relief.  Id. 
 258.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit agreed that “whether an alien is compelled to assist in persecution is 
immaterial for persecutor-bar purposes.”  Id. (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34). 
 259.  Id. at 1164 (“The Government, like the BIA and the Court of Appeals, relies on Fedorenko 
to provide the answer.  This reliance is not without some basis, as the Court there held that 
voluntariness was not required with respect to another persecutor bar.  To the extent, however, the 
Government deems Fedorenko to be controlling, it is in error.” (citations omitted)). 
 260.  Id. at 1165. 
 261.  See supra note 252 and accompanying text (describing the statute discussed in Fedorenko). 
 262.  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1166. 
 263.  See supra note 49 (explaining the doctrine of Chevron deference). 
 264.  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167. 
 265.  Id.  The Court described this failed assumption as stemming from “a failure to recognize the 
inapplicability of the principle of statutory construction invoked in Fedorenko, as well as a failure to 
appreciate the differences in statutory purpose.”  Id.  See also infra note 357 and accompanying text 
(describing the principle of statutory construction employed in Fedorenko). 
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determine, in the first instance, whether motive and intent are relevant to the 
persecutor’s bar as applied to asylum.266 
C.  Alternatives to Asylum for Victims of Human Trafficking and Former 
Child Soldiers 
If a victim of human trafficking or former child soldier is denied asylum 
due to a failure to fall under a protected ground, she will also be unable to 
attain withholding of removal or humanitarian asylum.267  While 
humanitarian asylum is designed to protect applicants who fail to satisfy the 
elements for asylum, applicants are not excused from having to establish one 
of the five protected grounds.268  Moreover, humanitarian asylum has the 
additional burden that an applicant must demonstrate a “compelling reason” 
not to be returned to their country.269  Even if a victim of human trafficking 
or a former child soldier can establish severe psychological effects 
amounting to a “compelling reason,” which cannot be established without 
difficulty,270 the applicant must still establish that their persecution was 
motivated by one of the five protected grounds.271 
 
 266.  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167.  Due to the significant differences between the statute in 
Fedorenko and the one applicable to asylum, and “[h]aving concluded that the BIA has not yet 
exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question, ‘the proper course, except in rare 
circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.’”  Id. at 1167–
68 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)).  See also supra note 49 (explaining the 
doctrine of Chevron deference).  “‘[I]f an agency erroneously contends that Congress’ intent has 
been clearly expressed and has rested on that ground, we remand to require the agency to consider 
the question afresh in light of the ambiguity we see.’”  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1167 (quoting Cajun 
Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 924 F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
 267.  See Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 377. 
 268.  Ghotra v. Gonzales, 179 F. App’x 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 269.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 377–78.  A “compelling reason” applies when 
an applicant’s past persecution was “particularly atrocious and the individual is experiencing 
ongoing traumatic psychological effects which would render return to the country of origin 
intolerable.”  Id. at 378.  See also supra note 100 and accompanying text.  It may be said that “the 
impact on the individual of the previous persecution continues.”  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra 
note 71, at 378. 
 270.  Due to the burden of establishing a “compelling reason,” humanitarian asylum is notoriously 
difficult to attain and courts rarely consider granting it.  See, e.g., Jalloh v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 148, 
150 (2d Cir. 2007).  In Jalloh, the applicant was attacked by a group who opposed his political 
opinions.  Id.  Initially, the attackers physically assaulted him on at least two occasions, during one 
of which his family was also assaulted.  Id.  On another occasion, when the applicant’s house was 
looted and his valuables were stolen, he “pleaded for his life and was spared.”  Id.  On another 
occasion, the attackers took the applicant and his family outside of their house and tied the 
applicant’s and his wife’s hands behind their backs.  Id.  They subsequently beat the applicant and 
raped his wife and burned his house to the ground.  Id.  The applicant and his family were then taken 
to a mountainous area, where they were held captive for two weeks.  Id.  They were kept as 
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Withholding of removal also fails to protect victims of human 
trafficking and former child soldiers left behind by asylum law.  To be 
eligible for withholding of removal, as for asylum, an alien must establish 
that her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of 
removal on account of one of the five protected grounds.272  To be granted 
withholding, the applicant must establish a “clear probability” of 
persecution.273  “This burden of proof is more stringent than that required to 
establish eligibility for asylum.”274  Accordingly, if an applicant is unable to 
satisfy the less stringent burden of asylum, she will necessarily be unable to 
satisfy the higher standard for withholding of removal.275 
Unlike asylum and withholding of removal, CAT relief may seem 
promising for victims of human trafficking and former child soldiers 
because it does not require membership in one of the five protected 
grounds.276  In determining whether an applicant qualifies for CAT relief, the 
fact finder must determine whether, upon return to the home country, the 
applicant would “more likely than not” be subjected to torture.277  An 
applicant could argue that being forced into human trafficking or child 
soldiering qualifies as torture.  Even if the applicant is successful in doing 
so, past torture does not create a presumption of future torture under CAT.278  
The applicant would have to prove that a future abduction is “more likely 
than not,”279 which could be hard to do.  Therefore, similar to withholding of 
removal and the provisions of humanitarian asylum, victims of human 
trafficking and former child soldiers abandoned by asylum law also likely 
 
prisoners, beaten, and threatened with death and amputation.  Id.  The BIA held that the applicant’s 
past experiences were not severe enough to qualify him for humanitarian asylum.  Id.  Humanitarian 
asylum is generally restricted to those who have endured such extreme past experiences as “torture, 
extended imprisonment or repeated physical abuse, usually at the hands of totalitarian regimes.”  
Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 576 (7th Cir. 2008).  See also supra note 100 and 
accompanying text. 
 271.  See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 272.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006).  See also supra notes 86−90 and accompanying text. 
 273.  INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984).  See also supra notes 86−90 and accompanying 
text. 
 274.  Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1987)).  See also supra notes 86−90 and accompanying text. 
 275.  Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 557 (“Because [the applicant] has not established that she is eligible 
for asylum, she ‘cannot satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of deportation.’” (quoting 
Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 276.  See supra text accompanying note 96. 
 277.  See supra text accompanying note 93. 
 278.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2010) (explaining that past torture is relevant to a finding of future 
torture but does not create a presumption of such). 
 279.  See supra text accompanying note 93. 
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would fail to find protection under CAT.280  United States asylum law must 
be modified in order to afford protection to these groups. 
VI.  SYNTHESIZING A UNIFORM APPROACH TO GRANTING ASYLUM TO 
VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND FORMER CHILD SOLDIERS 
A.  Victims of Human Trafficking 
The most viable route for a female victim of human trafficking to attain 
asylum is to establish that she was targeted for persecution due to her 
gender, or in other words, her membership in the particular social group of 
“women in (her specified country).”281  Despite the fact that such a social 
group satisfies all requirements set forth by the seminal case Acosta,282 
courts have varied as to whether it is a proper social group.283  Yielding to 
the purpose of United States asylum law, public policy considerations, and 
trends in scholarly thought,284 the line of cases that hold that gender as a 
 
 280.  See supra notes 267–79 and accompanying text. 
 281.  See supra notes 168–76 and accompanying text.  A victim of human trafficking can 
alternatively gain asylum under the social group of “victims of human trafficking” if she can prove 
that upon return to her country, she will be targeted because of her status as an escaped trafficker.  
See supra notes 174–87 and accompanying text.  There is a lack of case law exhibiting women who 
have shown a fear of future persecution based on their status as escaped traffickers.  However, it is 
possible for a victim of trafficking to prove such.  See Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 
379 (“Trafficked women . . . can be particularly susceptible to serious reprisals by traffickers after 
their escape and/or upon return, as well as to a real possibility of being re-trafficked or of being 
subjected to severe family or community ostracism and/or severe discrimination.”).  There is also a 
chain of actors involved in trafficking, beginning with the abductors in the country of origin, to 
transporters, sellers, and purchasers.  Id. at 382.  The threat posed by people at each level may help 
victims establish a fear of future persecution.  Id. 
 282.  In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).  In addition to the factors to be discussed, a 
social group must possess “a recognized level of social visibility,” which women satisfy as they are 
easily identifiable.  Sarah Siddiqui, Comment, Membership in a Particular Social Group: All 
Approaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 526 (2010) (citing In re 
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211).  The BIA also requires a social group to have particularity and 
immutability, both of which the social group of “women” possesses.  Id. 
 283.  The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that defining a social group based on 
gender is too broad.  See supra notes 193–208 and accompanying text.  Yet, the Third, Sixth, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that defining a group based on gender is not too broad.  See 
supra notes 193–208 and accompanying text.  Note that the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have 
held both ways.  See supra notes 193–208 and accompanying text. 
 284.  See, e.g., Siddiqui, supra note 282.  Siddiqui explains that, despite being a broad category, 
women are a social group and share common fundamental and social characteristics.  Id. at 526.  
While there are many differences among women, they share a “defined social status” and are viewed 
as a group by society.  Id.  The article points out that women often face harm that would not have 
been inflicted upon them were they men.  Id. at 506–07.  The failure of some courts to grant social 
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social group is too broad a category should be struck down.  The Convention 
does not restrict social groups to a specified list.285  Rather, it states that the 
term social group “should be read in an evolutionary manner, open to the 
diverse and changing nature of groups in various societies and evolving 
international human rights norms.”286 
Courts have justified their restriction on the breadth of social groups 
based on the notion that an excessively broad group would fail the 
particularity requirement.287  The definition of the particularity requirement, 
however, does not include a restriction on the breadth of the group.288  
Particularity simply means to be defined with enough clarity and specificity 
as to distinguish group members from non-group members.289  Therefore, 
the particularity requirement addresses the language used to define a group, 
not the narrowness of the group itself.  Categorizing a group by gender 
establishes a clear way to distinguish group members from non-group 
members and thus undoubtedly satisfies the particularity requirement.290  
Courts that have cited to the particularity requirement when deeming a group 
defined by gender as impermissibly broad have done so without an adequate 
foundation.291 
Courts hold that “women from (a specified country)” is too broad a 
category to define a social group because allowing for such a group would 
open the floodgates; courts fear that any woman from said country would be 
able to attain asylum.292  In In re R-A-,293 the DHS was apprehensive to 
 
group status to women is clearly misguided; judges should conform to the line of cases that correctly 
apply Acosta and grant social group recognition to women.  Id. at 532. 
 285.  See Guidelines: Membership of a Particular Social Group, supra note 117. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  See, e.g., Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
social group failed the particularity requirement because it made up a large portion of society); Zhou 
v. Holder, 376 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that “a large group of people” lacks 
“sufficient particularity” to constitute a social group). 
 288.  A group is not defined with sufficient particularity if it is “too amorphous to provide an 
adequate benchmark for determining group membership.”  In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
69 (B.I.A. 2007).  See also supra note 125.  A group fails the particularity requirement if is too 
loosely defined, causing it to be indeterminate.  See supra note 125.  Neither of these explanations 
suggests that the size of the group affects its particularity. 
 289.  See supra note 125. 
 290.  Siddiqui, supra note 282, at 526. 
 291.  See supra notes 193–208 and accompanying text (citing circuits that have found gender too 
broad a category to define a social group).  See also infra note 300 and accompanying text 
(describing the lack of legal basis for imposing a breadth restriction). 
 292.  See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005) (“There may be 
understandable concern in using gender as a group-defining characteristic.  One may be reluctant to 
permit, for example, half a nation’s residents to obtain asylum on the ground that women are 
persecuted there.”).  Scholars have noted that “[o]ften lurking, and sometimes explicit, in [decisions 
denying social group status to females] is an apparent concern over the large numbers of women 
potentially eligible for asylum, should the individual’s claim be recognized.”  Knight, supra note 96, 
at 11.  See also Siddiqui, supra note 282, at 521 (explaining that opposition to the recognition of 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:19 PM 
[Vol. 39: 423, 2012] Seeking Asylum 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
463 
define a social group as “women in Guatemala,” because of the fear of 
opening the floodgates to countless cases.294  This led the court to construct a 
much narrower social group: “[M]arried women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave the relationship.”295  When judges want to grant victims 
asylum, but are prohibited from placing them in the social group of 
“women,” they create varying social group definitions like the one in In re 
R-A-, which lead to “artificial and frivolous [social group] constructions.”296  
Whether the fear is of opening the floodgates to countless victims of 
persecution, or that many applicants will be granted asylum who do not 
genuinely deserve it, both concerns are unfounded. 
Assuming, arguendo, that all women from a specified country would 
indeed be eligible for asylum, which they would not,297 this should not 
render a claim invalid.298  While breadth is a frequent issue in gender-based 
claims,299 it has no basis in law.300  The size of a proposed social group “is 
not a relevant criterion . . . . The fact that large numbers of persons risk 
persecution cannot be a ground for refusing to extend international 
protection where it is otherwise appropriate, . . . [n]or is it consistent with 
well-established facts.”301  Decisions that strike down social groups as 
overbroad usually do so when the purported social group is defined by 
 
gender as a defining characteristic for a social group is “based on a misunderstanding that it is 
overbroad and, in effect, would recognize every woman in certain countries as a refugee”). 
 293.  In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 2001). 
 294.  Siddiqui, supra note 282, at 527. 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  See id. at 530 (citing Eve McCabe, Comment, The Inadequacy of International Human 
Rights Law to Protect the Rights of Women as Illustrated by the Crisis in Afghanistan, 5 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 419, 445 (2000–01)). 
 297.  If courts recognize “women in (a specified country)” as a social group, this would not render 
all women in that country eligible for asylum because the remaining elements cannot be established 
without difficulty.  See infra notes 314–24 and accompanying text. 
 298.  Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e reject the notion that an applicant 
is ineligible for asylum merely because all members of a persecuted group might [consequently] be 
eligible for asylum.”).  In Singh, the BIA denied an Indo-Fijian man’s application for asylum from 
Fiji because the violence to which he was subjugated was directed against Indo-Fijians, a group that 
comprised half of the nation.  Id. at 1356.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit deemed it unfounded to 
reject a group simply because it represents a large portion of the population.  Id. at 1359.  Although 
the Ninth Circuit in this case did not affirmatively decide whether Indo-Fijians would constitute a 
social group, “its reasoning supports the principle that the size and breadth of a group alone does not 
preclude a group from qualifying as such a social group.”  Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 299.  See Knight, supra note 96, at 11. 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  Id. (quoting Guidelines: Membership in a Particular Social Group, supra note 117, ¶¶ 18–
19). 
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characteristics that fail to specify the reasons why the persecutors harm the 
victims.302  The DHS has explained that “[t]hese decisions should not be 
read to mean that a group must be small in order to qualify as a particular 
social group.”303 
Courts that are cognizant of this fact have noted that “the focus with 
respect to [gender-related] claims should be not on whether either gender 
constitutes a social group . . . but on whether the members of that group are 
sufficiently likely to be persecuted.”304  Courts conflating the elements of the 
appropriateness of the social group definition and the likelihood of being 
persecuted have stated that a group is overbroad because “no factfinder 
could reasonably conclude that all . . . women [from a certain country] had a 
well-founded fear of persecution based solely on their gender.”305  However, 
importing the “well-founded fear” requirement to an analysis of social group 
is improper.306  Not every member of a social group has to have a well-
founded fear of persecution in order for that social group to be valid.307  
Whether an applicant’s group membership actually gives rise to a well-
founded fear of persecution is a separate question from the analysis of the 
viability of the social group.308  Conflating such variables is erroneous. 
The fact that a group’s breadth has no place in an analysis of a particular 
social group is well established in international law.  International guidelines 
explain that using “[t]he size of the group . . . as a basis for refusing to 
recognise ‘women’ generally as a particular social group . . . has no basis in 
fact or reason, as the other grounds are not bound by this question of 
size.”309  The international guidelines continue to explain that “[w]omen are 
an example of a social subset of individuals who are defined by innate and 
immutable characteristics and are frequently treated differently to men.  As 
 
 302.  Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 22, In 
re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (B.I.A. 2005) (No. A 73 753 922), available at 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/legal/dhs_brief_ra.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) [hereinafter 
DHS Position]. 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  Niang v. Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005).  See also supra note 220 and 
accompanying text. 
 305.  Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 306.  DHS Position, supra note 302, at 22–23.  The well-founded fear standard is a separate 
element and “[t]he confusion of th[is] element . . . in the social group analysis results in an incorrect 
and misleading conclusion.”  Id. at 23. 
 307.  Id. (“There is no requirement that all those who possess a protected characteristic have a 
well-founded fear in order for a characteristic to qualify as a protected one.”). 
 308.  See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text. 
 309.  Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 14 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 457, 466 (2002) [hereinafter Guidelines: Gender-Related Persecution].  See 
also Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 385 (“[T]he size of the purported social group is 
not a relevant criterion in determining whether a social group exists.”). 
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such, they may constitute a particular social group.”310  Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom have all recognized gender as a proper basis for a 
particular social group.311  Despite international recognition that gender may 
define a social group, many U.S. courts have taken the opposing view.  A 
recent Ninth Circuit case, however, shows hope that we may begin to head 
in the right direction. 
In Perdomo v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit did not make a conclusive 
determination as to whether “women in [a given country]” may constitute a 
social group, but remanded the case for the BIA to make such a legal 
determination in the first instance.312  Critics of the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
in Perdomo may express concern that if the BIA holds valid the social group 
of “women in Guatemala,” many fraudulent cases may be brought by 
women who do not genuinely fear persecution, but rather are seeking to take 
advantage of the opportunity to move their families to the United States.313  
Some circuits have rejected “women” as a social group on the reasoning that 
“if a woman has a well-founded fear of persecution because she is a woman, 
the necessary implication is that all women have a well-founded fear of 
persecution simply because they are women, and this simply cannot be.”314   
However, it is erroneous to conclude that allowing a gender-based social 
group would render all applicants of that gender eligible for asylum.  Such 
an assumption fails to acknowledge that social group membership is one of a 
number of elements that an applicant must satisfy to be granted asylum.315  
Among these hurdles is the fact that an applicant must prove a well-founded 
fear of persecution.316  To do so, the applicant must either evidence past 
persecution, or a well-founded fear of future persecution supported by 
 
 310.  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 386. 
 311.  Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 n.5 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Minister for Immigration 
& Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 76 ALJR 667 (Austl.); Higbogun v. Canada, [2010] F.C. 
445 (Can.); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1999] 2 All E.R. 546 (Eng.)). 
 312.  Id. at 669.  Despite the promising nature of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, there is no guarantee 
that the BIA will approve the social group.  Even if it does, it is unknown whether Perdomo will 
“resonate [] in other circuits or [extend] to embrace women in other countries which can be accused 
of relegating women to an inferior status.”  Seipp, supra note 190, at 1423. 
 313.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (2006) (explaining that applicants who have been granted asylum also 
earn derivative asylum for their spouses and children). 
 314.  Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States, 
Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 
61 (1998).  See also, e.g., supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (noting cases that have denied 
social group recognition to women for fear of opening the floodgates). 
 315.  Knight, supra note 96, at 11. 
 316.  See supra notes 50, 55–57 and accompanying text. 
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subjective and objective components.317  These requirements prevent an 
applicant with a fraudulent claim and no risk of persecution from being 
granted asylum.318  This is especially true in light of the recent passage of the 
Real ID Act, which gives judges with the discretion to find adverse 
credibility merely because an applicant fails to corroborate her testimony.319  
Thus, if an applicant’s claim has no basis, she would lack corroborating 
evidence, which may lead to an adverse credibility finding and, 
consequently, denial of asylum.320  Another obstacle is that an applicant not 
only has to prove membership in a social group, but also that her feared 
persecution is on account of that membership.321  In order to do so, an 
applicant may need to prove that women in her country are abducted 
significantly more than men, or that the prevalence of the abduction of 
females in her town is high.322  Other countries that have recognized gender-
based claims further illustrate that doing so would not give rise to a surge of 
female refugees.323  Canada was the first nation to acknowledge that women 
fleeing gender-related persecution qualified for protection, and reported no 
explosion of claims by women following the implementation of such 
guidelines.324 
Even if courts’ fear of opening the floodgates was well-founded, the 
proper course of action should not be to return victims to countries where 
their human rights will be violated, but to address the human rights 
violations at their roots.325  If courts close the doors to gender-based claims 
 
 317.  See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text. 
 318.  As described by Kevin Johnson, Dean of the University of California-Davis Law School, 
even if the BIA in Perdomo announces approval of the social group “women in Guatemala,” 
“[p]roving that [the applicant] will face persecution if she is returned to Guatemala and that the 
country doesn’t protect its young women will be hard to prove . . . . Any other Guatemalan women 
hoping to take advantage of [such a ruling] will have to do the same.”  Mariano Castillo, Court 
Ruling Affects Guatemalan Women Seeking Asylum in U.S., CNN (July 13, 2010, 7:13 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/13/california.guatemalan.appeal. 
 319.  The Real ID Act allows an adjudicator to demand corroboration of an applicant’s testimony.  
See supra note 226.  If an applicant fails to provide such, the adjudicator may deem the applicant not 
credible and deny the application.  See supra note 226. 
 320.  See supra note 226 (describing that an adverse credibility finding necessitates the denial of 
asylum). 
 321.  See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that in order to qualify for protection 
as a member of a social group, an applicant must identify a valid group, establish membership in the 
group, and show persecution on account of that membership).  See also supra note 220 and 
accompanying text. 
 322.  See supra notes 220–23 and accompanying text. 
 323.  See supra note 311 and accompanying text (noting other countries that have recognized 
women as a social group).  See also Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: 
Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 120 (2007). 
 324.  Jenny-Brooke Condon, Comment, Asylum Law’s Gender Paradox, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
207, 216, 255 (2002). 
 325.  Musalo, supra note 323, at 120. 
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due to a fear of an influx of applications, they undermine the purpose of 
allowing the social group category.326 
Another argument many courts have used to deny social group status to 
females is that trafficking is purportedly not motivated by gender, but is 
rather criminal behavior towards the population in general.327  As one 
scholar pointed out, “The repeated references by adjudicators denying 
trafficking claims to the fact that the conduct is criminal in nature are 
puzzling.”328  Whether a persecutory act constitutes criminal behavior has no 
bearing on whether that persecution was motivated by one of the five 
protected grounds.329  A persecutor may have various motives for targeting 
an applicant.330  The existence of other motivating factors does not render 
the applicant ineligible.331  To be eligible for asylum, an applicant’s 
persecution must have been motivated by one of the five protected grounds, 
not as the sole reason, but as “at least one central reason.”332  Gender may 
 
 326.  See Bradley B. Banias, Comment, “Membership in a Particular Social Group”: Does 
America Comply with Its International Obligation?, 1 CHARLESTON L. REV. 123, 129 (2007). 
 327.  Knight, supra note 96, at 6.  See, e.g., supra note 199 (describing that a victim of human 
trafficking was denied asylum because the IJ found that she was not persecuted because of one of the 
five protected grounds, and that her kidnappers “did not target [her] for any purpose other than for 
their own criminal enrichment” (quoting In re H-H-, A# redacted (Chi., IL, Immigration Court, May 
29, 2003) at 7 (CGRS Case #2506))). 
 328.  Knight, supra note 96, at 8. 
 329.  Id. (“Many acts of persecution also amount to criminal conduct; that reason alone hardly 
renders them unable to support a claim to asylum.  Physical violence, rape and sexual assault, 
torture, destruction of personal property, death threats, and other crimes have all been found to 
support grants of asylum.”). 
 330.  See, e.g., Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004) (“That [applicant’s] 
supervisor might also have been motivated by personal dislike . . . does not undermine [applicant’s] 
claim of persecution.”); Jahed v. INS, 356 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that the persecutor 
was motivated both by his desire for money as well as the applicant’s political affiliation); Borja v. 
INS, 175 F.3d 732, 737–38 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that a Filipino man who had been targeted for 
extortion as well as political motives was eligible for asylum). 
 331.  “[V]ictims [of human trafficking] are likely to be targeted above all because of their 
perceived or potential commercial value to the traffickers.  This overriding economic motive does 
not, however, exclude the possibility of Convention-related grounds in the targeting and selection of 
victims of trafficking.”  Guidelines on Trafficking, supra note 71, at 383.  “[E]ven if an individual is 
not trafficked solely and exclusively for a Convention reason, one or more of these Convention 
grounds may have been relevant for the trafficker’s selection of the particular victim.”  Id. at 384. 
 332.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).  This standard has changed with the passage of the Real 
ID Act.  For applications filed before May 11, 2005, the applicant need only have shown that their 
persecution was motivated “at least in part” by a protected ground.  See, e.g., Sinha v. Holder, 564 
F.3d 1015, 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating the IJ’s decision denying asylum for an applicant 
who was targeted “at least in part” on account of his race); Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 996 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (“Torture . . . conducted at least in part on account of [a protected ground], provides a 
proper basis for asylum and withholding of deportation even if the torture served intelligence 
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still qualify as a “central reason” for the persecution, even if another factor 
was the dominant reason.333 
In addition to coming into alignment with international standards and 
being in accordance with mandatory U.S. precedent, public policy justifies 
allowing females status as a social group.334  Human trafficking is a 
prevalent problem, one for which the root is hard to weed out.335  One reason 
why traffickers are difficult to catch is because the only ones who know of 
their whereabouts—the victims—may be apprehensive to speak out due to 
fear of being punished if returned to their country.336  If a victim obtains 
asylum, she may be more comfortable revealing information because she can 
rest assured that she will not be sent back to her country where she may be 
punished.  By encouraging these victims to cooperate with the government 
in tracking down traffickers, the rate of trafficking may effectively be 
reduced.  Currently, there are programs that seek to bring about this effect, 
but fail to do so effectively.337 
B.  Former Child Soldiers 
Like victims of human trafficking, former child soldiers may seek 
membership in either of two social groups: “former child soldiers” or 
“children in (a specified country).”338  Applicants may receive asylum under 
the social group of “former child soldiers” only if they can establish a fear of 
future persecution independent from their showing of past persecution by 
 
gathering purposes.” (emphasis added)).  For applications filed after May 11, 2005, the Real ID Act 
specifies that one of the five protected grounds must be “at least one central reason” for persecuting 
the applicant.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).  One way to determine that a motive is a “central 
reason” for persecution is “if the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if such motive did 
not exist.”  Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009).  Alternatively, a motive 
qualifies as a “‘central reason’ if that motive, standing alone, would have led the persecutor to harm 
the applicant.”  Id.  This latter route would likely be harder for victims of human trafficking to take 
because in most cases they would not be trafficked but for economic reasons.  See supra text 
accompanying note 136 (describing monetary gain as a motivation for trafficking).  However, being 
a female is in most cases also a necessary factor in being trafficked, and would therefore satisfy the 
first method of establishing a “central reason.”  See supra text accompanying note 139 (noting that 
the primary targets for human trafficking are females). 
 333.  See Parussimova, 555 F.3d at 741 (“[P]ersecution may be caused by more than one central 
reason, and an asylum applicant need not prove which reason was dominant.”). 
 334.  Some authors have even proposed adding “gender” as a sixth protected ground.  Siddiqui, 
supra note 282, at 531.  This, however, requires additional legislation, which is unnecessary under 
my proposal to grant women status as a social group. 
 335.  The U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report estimates that 800,000 people 
are trafficked across international borders every year.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
  336.  See supra text accompanying note 138 (noting that victims are often told they or their family 
members will be killed if they escape). 
 337.  See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text (describing efforts to reduce trafficking and 
the virulence of the problem). 
  338.  See supra text accompanying note 225. 
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demonstrating that the organizations for which they were  soldiers have a 
history of exacting retribution on escaped soldiers.339  Such a showing may 
be easier for a former child soldier to accomplish than it would for a victim 
of human trafficking.340  Accordingly, a former child soldier may be more 
likely to attain social group status as a “former child soldier” as he or she 
would a “child in (his country of origin).”341 
While the social groups of “children” and “women” face distinct 
obstacles, they also have similarities.  Like women, children face the 
obstacle that courts are hesitant to grant social group status to groups 
comprising large portions of a nation’s population, in fear of opening the 
floodgates to countless cases.342  Mindful of the arguments discussed in the 
preceding section supporting the notion that breadth and size are not relevant 
factors to finding a social group,343 children fall under the same analysis.  
While they comprise a broad group, breadth is not a factor that should be 
taken into consideration when analyzing whether a group qualifies as a 
social group for purposes of asylum.344  Complicating children’s situation, 
however, are two distinctions between children and women that lead the 
former to be less often recognized as a possible social group.  The 
distinctions between the groups, however, do not require such a conclusion. 
One obstacle children face, unique from women, is that “youth” has 
been said to not be “immutable,” one of the requirements of a social 
group.345  “Youth” is said not to be immutable because children do not 
remain children forever.346  This interpretation, however, misapplies the 
immutability requirement.  Immutability requires that the characteristic be 
 
 339.  See supra notes 176–87 and accompanying text. 
 340.  There are numerous cases approving “former child soldiers” as a social group, but cases 
approving “victims of human trafficking” are lacking.  See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 
179–80 (3d Cir. 2003).  In Lukwago, the applicant was a former child soldier who presented 
evidence that the persecuting party he escaped from exacted retribution on escaped children.  Id.  
The applicant provided evidence that his persecutors routinely killed escaped children to punish 
them or to make an example of them.  Id.  The court found him to have a well-founded fear of future 
persecution based on his membership in the social group of former child soldiers.  Id. 
 341.  See infra notes 346–47, 351–52 and accompanying text (describing two obstacles to social 
group recognition unique to children: immutability and particularity). 
 342.  See supra note 124 and accompanying text (citing cases in which courts found that groups 
comprising a large percentage of a nation’s population may not qualify as social groups). 
 343.  See supra notes 282–334 and accompanying text. 
 344.  See supra notes 283–335 and accompanying text. 
 345.  See, e.g., Argueta-Rodriguez v. INS, No. 95-2367, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1997) 
(explaining that being a child is not an immutable characteristic). 
 346.  Flores-Cruz v. Holder, 325 F. App’x 512, 514 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that because children 
“age out” of their group, they do not satisfy the immutability requirement of a social group). 
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unchangeable by will.347  Children cannot actively control the point at which 
they are no longer children.  Therefore, the natural evolution out of the 
category of “children” does not invalidate it as a social group for reasons of 
immutability.348  A refugee does not have to face a permanent threat of 
persecution in order to be protected.349 
Another obstacle children face that women do not in attaining social 
group status is that a social group described as “children” or “youth” may 
fail, for good reason, the particularity requirement.  Particularity requires 
that a group be defined with sufficiently specific terms to avoid 
indeterminacy.350  Thus, groups defined with broad terms such as “children” 
or “youth” will fail this requirement.351  However, this hurdle can easily be 
avoided by defining the group with a specific age range.  If an applicant 
defines his social group as “children between the ages of ten and eighteen,” 
or the specific range applicable to his case, he satisfies the particularity 
requirement.352  The aforementioned obstacles having been minimized, 
children should be able to attain status as a social group. 
When a former child soldier attains social group recognition, his plight 
does not end there.  Following Fedorenko v. United States,353 courts have 
denied asylum to applicants falling under the persecutor’s bar354 even if such 
 
 347.  In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) (explaining that youth may define a 
social group because that status “cannot be changed” by the applicant).  Despite the fact that the 
applicant in Kasinga would inevitably “age out” of her status, the BIA found youth to be a 
fundamental element in defining her social group.  Id. 
 348.  Matthew D. Muller, Deborah E. Anker & Lory Diana Rosenberg, Escobar v. Gonzales: A 
Backwards Step for Child Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law in Particular Social Group Asylum 
Claims, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 243, 246 (2006) (“[An applicant’s] claim is not 
undermined by the temporary nature of youth . . . .”).  While children will eventually grow older, 
their status as children is “fundamental and immutable.”  Id.  “It is clear from cases applying Acosta 
that the temporal nature of childhood does not undermine a claim.”  Id. at 246 n.12.  Note also that 
children are recognized by society as well as the legal system as “a ‘group’ that requires protection.”  
Id.  Some examples include labor and immigration laws that protect children merely because of their 
youth.  Id. (citing INA § 1504(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2005) (extending protection to child 
domestic violence survivors)). 
 349.  Id. at 246–47. 
 350.  Supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text.  A group is not defined with sufficient 
particularity if it does not provide a benchmark to determine group membership.  See supra notes 
287–89 and accompanying text. 
 351.  Flores-Cruz, 325 F. App’x at 514 (quoting Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745 
(9th Cir. 2008) (finding the social group of “Honduran street children” to be “‘too loosely defined’ 
to meet the particularity requirement”)). 
 352.  See supra note 243 and accompanying text (explaining that judges who have denied social 
groups for failing the particularity requirement did so because the groups’ defining terms were too 
vague and thereby insufficient to distinguish group members from non-group members). 
 353.  449 U.S. 490 (1981). 
 354.  The persecutor’s bar to asylum states that if an applicant persecuted another, based on one of 
the five protected grounds, the applicant is ineligible for asylum.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).  
See also supra notes 241–62 and accompanying text. 
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applicants claimed that their actions were involuntary and done under the 
coercion of a third party.355  While this approach may seem harsh, one 
reason for such a strict application of the bar is if duress exempted a person 
from the bar, any persecutor would claim his actions were involuntary.356  
The Supreme Court in Fedorenko explained that if Congress had intended 
the statute to include a voluntariness requirement, it would have done so 
explicitly.357  Recently, however, the Supreme Court in Negusie v. Holder358 
held that Fedorenko is not controlling over asylum cases because it 
addressed a persecutor’s bar as applied to a different provision than that of 
asylum.359  The Supreme Court’s groundbreaking decision in Negusie 
invalidated almost two decades of reliance on Fedorenko.360  The Court 
remanded Negusie to the BIA to determine, in the first instance, whether 
motive and intent are relevant to the persecutor’s bar as applied towards 
asylum.361 
If the Ninth Circuit, upon hearing Negusie on remand, finds coercion to 
be a relevant factor in applying the persecutor’s bar towards asylum, it will 
make the case for former child soldiers much easier.  Applicants will have a 
chance of surpassing the persecutor’s bar by showing that they were forced 
to persecute others.  While opponents raise valid arguments against the 
implementation of an exception to the persecutor’s bar, such analyses do not 
properly apply towards children as they would for adults.362  The Ninth 
Circuit should maintain that adults are subject to the persecutor’s bar 
regardless of alleged coercion, but should apply a coercion exception to the 
bar for children. 
Proponents of a uniform application of the persecutor’s bar, regardless 
of coercion, argue that even if Fedorenko addresses a different bar than that 
 
 355.  See supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text. 
 356.  See infra note 375 and accompanying text. 
 357.  The Court concluded that Congress did not intend a voluntariness requirement for the 
persecutor’s bar in section 2(a) of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA), by comparing section 
2(a) with section 2(b).  Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.  The Court reasoned that because section 2(b) 
explicitly excludes only those individuals who voluntarily assisted the enemy forces, the omission of 
the word “voluntarily” from section 2(a) was deliberate and thus the statute barred all who assisted 
in the persecution of others, including those who did so under coercion.  Id. 
 358.  129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009). 
 359.  See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 360.  See supra notes 249–53 and accompanying text. 
 361.  See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 362.  See infra notes 386–99 and accompanying text (explaining that children require a different 
analysis than adults). 
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applicable to asylum, its principles are still analogous.363  Opponents of a 
uniform application of the bar argue otherwise.  As Justice Stevens pointed 
out in his concurrence to Negusie, “We do not normally convict individuals 
of crimes when their actions are coerced or otherwise involuntary.”364  He 
then noted that the other nations that are signatories of the Convention “read 
the Convention’s [persecutor’s bar] as limited to culpable conduct.”365  
Justice Stevens’ third suggestion was that “an alien’s lack of knowledge that 
he was involved in a persecutory act could likewise indicate that he did not 
act with the requisite culpability.”366  Because Justice Stevens’ three-fold 
argument fails on each count,367 the BIA should determine coercion is not 
relevant to adults when hearing this case on appeal.  However, because 
children must be held to a different standard as adults, coercion should be 
relevant in determining whether to apply the persecutor’s bar towards 
them.368 
Justice Stevens’s first argument, comparing the denial of asylum to a 
conviction of a crime, fails because, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his 
concurrence with Negusie, “this is not a criminal matter.”369  Justice Scalia 
continued to explain that asylum is a benefit, not an entitlement, and 
“withholding that benefit from all who have intentionally harmed others—
whether under coercion or not—is not unreasonable.”370  Furthermore, 
Justice Stevens’s explanation of other nations’ implementation of the 
persecutor’s bar fails to acknowledge that such practices are not binding on 
our law.371  Justice Stevens’s last argument—that an applicant’s lack of 
knowledge that he is inflicting persecution indicates that he did not act with 
culpability—neglects to acknowledge Justice Scalia’s suggestion, that “there 
 
 363.  See infra note 378 (explaining that Justice Thomas’s explanation that the circumstances 
surrounding the implementation of the DPA, which Fedorenko analyzed, are comparable to those 
that the asylum persecutor’s bar was meant to address). 
 364.  Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1175 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens 
continued that interpretations of the Convention reflect that “all relevant factors, including 
‘mitigating circumstances,’ must be considered in determining whether an alien’s acts are of a 
‘criminal nature.’”  Id.  The Justice fails to acknowledge that neither the Convention, nor its 
interpretation by international committees, are binding on U.S. law as the Convention is not a self-
executing treaty.  See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 365.  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1175 (Stevens, J., concurring).  Seemingly conceding that the laws of 
other nations are not binding on the United States, Justice Stevens suggests that “[w]hen we interpret 
treaties, we consider the interpretations of the courts of other nations, and we should do the same 
when Congress asks us to interpret a statute in light of a treaty’s language.”  Id. 
 366.  Id. at 1175 n.8. 
 367.  See infra notes 369–74 and accompanying text. 
 368.  See infra notes 385–90 and accompanying text. 
 369.  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., concurring).  “This Court has long understood that an 
‘order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.’”  Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)). 
 370.  Id. 
 371.  See supra note 364. 
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is no reason why the agency cannot consider questions of knowledge 
separate and apart from questions of duress.”372  Justice Scalia added that, in 
considering whether to grant an alien citizenship status, “culpability” is only 
one facet of the more general consideration of “desirability.”373  He noted 
reasons why those who persecuted others, even under coercion, would be 
undesirable citizens.374 
An important reason not to exempt involuntary actions from the 
persecutor’s bar as applied to adults is that doing so may cause many 
applicants subject to the bar to fraudulently claim their actions were 
involuntary.375  One counterargument may be that while many applicants 
may fraudulently claim to have been coerced, not all of them will be able to 
prove so.  If it were conceivable that applicants who were actually coerced 
had access to evidentiary support that a fraudulent applicant would not, then 
the opposition’s argument would prevail.  However, it is improbable that any 
applicant would have evidence to support his claim of coercion other than 
his own testimony, coupled with reports describing general country 
conditions.376  In theory, the opponents represent the best-case scenario: 
denying asylum to those who voluntarily persecuted others while granting 
asylum to those who did so under true coercion.  In reality, however, there is 
no pragmatic way to differentiate between the two.377  In addition to Justice 
 
 372.  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 373.  Id. at 1169. 
 374.  Id.  One example posed is the suggestion that it would be imprudent to grant entry both to an 
applicant who, under duress, inflicted persecution upon somebody, as well as his victim who 
suffered the persecution.  Id.  “The Nation has a legitimate interest in preventing the importation of 
ethnic strife from remote parts of the world, and the agency may resolve the statutory ambiguity in a 
way that safeguards that interest.”  Id. 
 375.  Justice Scalia explained that “the cost of error (viz., allowing un coerced persecutors to 
remain in the country permanently) might reasonably be viewed by the agency as significantly 
greater than the cost of overinclusion under a bright-line rule (viz., denial of asylum to some coerced 
persecutors . . . ).”  Id. at 1170. 
 376.  Highlighting this evidentiary issue, Justice Scalia pointed out that: 
 Immigration judges already face the overwhelming task of attempting to recreate, by a 
limited number of witnesses speaking through (often poor-quality) translation, events that 
took place years ago in foreign, usually impoverished countries. . . . Adding on top of that 
the burden of adjudicating claims of duress and coercion, which are extremely difficult to 
corroborate and necessarily pose questions of degree that require intensely fact-bound 
line-drawing, would increase the already inherently high risk of error. 
Id. at 1169–70. 
 377.  In addition to evidentiary boundaries posing a problem to drawing a line between culpable 
conduct and conduct done under duress, Justice Scalia explained that culpability “has always been a 
subject of intense debate, raising profound questions of moral philosophy and individual 
responsibility,” highlighting the “Nuremberg defense” as an example.  Id. at 1169.  Justice Scalia 
also pointed out that “[a]t common law, duress was not an accepted defense to intentional killing . . . 
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Scalia’s arguments, Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion to Negusie, 
explaining that “the INA unambiguously precludes any inquiry into whether 
the persecutor acted voluntarily, i.e., free from coercion or duress . . . .”378  
Further strengthening Justice Thomas’s case is that an applicant who is 
denied asylum and withholding of removal due to the persecutor’s bar has 
not exhausted all options.  If an applicant can prove that, more likely than 
not, the applicant would be tortured upon return to the home country, the 
applicant may be granted CAT relief.379  The persecutor’s bar does not 
exclude an applicant from attaining protection under CAT.380 
An alternative to these two approaches—examining duress or excluding 
it from the analysis—would be to balance the harm done by the applicants 
against the threat or level of duress imposed on them.  For example, if 
applicants were told that their families would be tortured if they failed to 
follow instructions, and the applicants had reason to believe their captors 
would follow through with their threat, the applicants would have a high 
level of duress.  If the applicants’ instructions were to notify their captors 
when victims attempted to escape, a court may deem that their actions 
amounted to persecution because they played a central role in the 
 
and in modern times, some states do not allow it as a defense to lesser crimes.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Justice Scalia also finds it noteworthy that “there is no historical support for the duress 
defense when a soldier follows a military order he knows to be unlawful.”  Id. 
 378.  Id. at 1176 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas began his dissent by dissecting the 
dictionary definitions of the terms “persecution,” “assist,” and “participate.”  Id. at 1179 (concluding 
that the assistance of and participation in persecution does not require that such actions be 
voluntary).  He then reverted to the analysis of statutory construction explained in Fedorenko, such 
that Congress has evidenced the ability to include a voluntariness requirement, and that its choice to 
exclude one in the persecutor’s bar renders it clear to have not been intended.  Id. at 1179–80.  See 
also supra note 357 and accompanying text (describing the statutory construction analysis employed 
by Fedorenko).  Justice Thomas then pointed out, as Justice Scalia did, that applicants barred from 
asylum may still qualify for other relief such as CAT relief.  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1180 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Thomas explained that the majority erred in finding the persecutor’s bar statute 
to be ambiguous because it failed to apply the “‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ . . . before 
retreating to ambiguity.”  Id. at 1183.  Justice Thomas concludes by criticizing the majority for 
distinguishing the statute in Fedorenko from the statute applicable to asylum.  Id. at 1185.  The 
majority concluded that the statute in Fedorenko was distinguishable from the INA bar because it 
was enacted to address the crimes against humanity committed during World War II, which were so 
horrific that they constitute a different scenario.  Id.  The majority reasoned that its unique context is 
what required the barring of “even those involved in nonculpable, involuntary assistance in Nazi 
persecution.”  Id.  Justice Thomas pointed out that it is erroneous to conclude that “all acts of 
persecution during the Second World War were inherently more depraved or reprehensible than all 
acts of persecution that have occurred in the decades since the INA’s enactment.”  Id.  Because, 
Justice Thomas explained, “Congress has steadfastly condemned all acts of persecution,” the same 
standard set forth in Fedorenko is applicable to the persecutor’s bar at hand.  Id. 
 379.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 380.  See supra notes 256–57 (describing a case in which an applicant was denied asylum due to 
the persecutor’s bar but was granted CAT relief). 
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persecution of those prisoners.381  The court, however, may take into 
consideration whether the applicants only reported the prisoners if they 
suspected their supervisors would otherwise find out and punish their 
families.  The court may also consider whether the applicants had 
opportunities to escape, but chose not to.382  Lastly, the court may weigh the 
harm done to the third party victims.  It will be relevant whether the 
hypothetical applicants reported a prisoner while knowing that the prisoner 
would subsequently be tortured, or knowing that the prisoner would get a 
slap on the wrist.  While such a balancing test seems promising, such an 
analysis requires excessive information, the evidence for which will virtually 
always be little more than the applicant’s own testimony.  Absent a unique 
source of evidence, this leads us to the same conclusion above, that 
voluntariness should not be a factor in applying the persecutor’s bar.383 
The synthesis between the notions of weighing and disregarding 
coercion is to consider it only for those most vulnerable to manipulation: 
children.384  While voluntariness should not be a requirement to apply the 
persecutor’s bar to adults, it should be required to apply the persecutor’s bar 
to children.  It is well-recognized that children are cognitively less 
developed than adults and that they require a specialized standard for many 
regulations.385  “Regardless of what acts a child commits . . . the United 
States should treat [children] presumptively as victims over perpetrators.”386  
In addition to being cognitively different from adults, escaped child soldiers 
who have arrived in the United States are usually “unrepresented and 
unaccompanied minors in a country that is foreign to them.”387  Scholars 
 
 381.  See supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining the analysis a court must partake in 
to determine whether an applicant’s assistance to persecution was material). 
 382.  This analysis would not be proper if applied towards children because children are reliant on 
the help of adults and would likely have no means of support if escaped from their only source of 
food and shelter.  See supra notes 384–99 and accompanying text (describing that children require a 
unique analysis). 
 383.  See supra notes 370–81 and accompanying text. 
 384.  See infra notes 386–99 and accompanying text (describing children’s vulnerabilities due to 
their underdeveloped cognitive skills). 
 385.  See infra notes 386–400 and accompanying text (describing that children require a unique 
analysis).  The need to hold children to a different standard than adults is also reflected by the 
difference between the juvenile delinquency system and adult correctional system.  Note also that 
Congress has recognized the special circumstances surrounding the use of child soldiers with the 
passage of the Child Soldiers Accountability Act.  Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1101. 
 386.  Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1099 (citing Christopher L. Dore, Comment, What to Do with 
Omar Khadr? Putting a Child Soldier on Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice, 
and Moral Culpability, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1281, 1319–20 (2008)). 
 387.  Id. at 1114. 
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have specifically noted that United States asylum law should be adjusted to 
provide more protection to former child soldiers.388  Commentators have 
suggested that judges should apply a duress exception to former child 
soldiers, or in the alternative, that the United States should implement a 
statutory exception from the persecutor’s bar for children through a 
legislative amendment of the INA.389  The United States has committed to 
take “all feasible measures to . . . accord to [former child soldiers] all 
appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and 
their social reintegration.”390  The United Nations has expressed concern that 
the United States has failed to completely abide by several provisions of this 
protocol.391  Among the concerns was that the United States asylum 
processes for former child soldiers was flawed.392  The UN and the 
American Civil Liberties Union Human Rights Program consequently set 
forth recommendations for the United States to come into compliance with 
the protocol.393  The UN noted that the provisions barring child soldiers from 
attaining asylum were intended to bar those who have recruited and 
victimized the child soldiers, not to bar the children themselves.394  
Recognizing this contrary effect, the UN recommended that the United 
States “provide protection for asylum-seeking and refugee children arriving 
to the United States . . . who may have been recruited or used in hostilities 
abroad.”395  Children are recruited to be soldiers because of “their relative 
inability to resist authority” and because “they seldom have alternatives to 
remaining loyal to their exploitive superiors.”396  Abductors exploit these 
characteristics and make children feel that they have no alternative but to 
follow their orders.397  Due to the unique impressionable state of a child’s 
 
 388.  Id. at 1113 (noting that the current level of protection is inadequate).  See also, e.g., Rachel 
Bien, Note, Nothing to Declare but Their Childhood: Reforming U.S. Asylum Law to Protect the 
Rights of Children, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 797 (2004) (suggesting a different legal standard for children 
and adults seeking asylum); Mary-Hunter Morris, Note, Babies and Bathwater: Seeking an 
Appropriate Standard of Review for the Asylum Applications of Former Child Soldiers, 21 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 281 (2008) (arguing that child soldiers seeking asylum should be held to a standard less 
stringent than adults because of duress); Benjamin Ruesch, Comment, Open the Golden Door: 
Practical Solutions for Child-Soldiers Seeking Asylum in the United States, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 
184 (2008) (advocating for statutory change based on the infancy and duress exceptions). 
 389.  Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1099–101. 
 390.  Id. at 1100. 
 391.  Id. at 1108.  The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child is responsible for 
supervising nations’ compliance with the Optional Protocol.  Id. 
 392.  Id. at 1109. 
 393.  Id. 
 394.  Id. at 1114. 
 395.  Id. at 1110. 
 396.  Id. at 1115. 
 397.  Id. 
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mind, commonly exacerbated by orphanage,398 children should be exempt 
from the persecutor’s bar if their actions were done under coercion.  As is 
the case for the social group analyses of “women” and “children,” the impact 
of failing to correct the analysis of the persecutor’s bar may have far-
reaching ramifications.399 
VII.  THE FORECASTED IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSALS SET 
FORTH BY THIS COMMENT 
International agencies have expressed grave concern over the issue of 
human trafficking.400  Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
described human trafficking as “one of the most egregious violations of 
human rights which the United Nations now confronts.”401  Human 
trafficking has also often been pointed out as a serious problem by top 
members of United States presidential administrations.402  In 2006, President 
George W. Bush announced the mission “to fight and end this modern form 
of slavery . . . .”403  Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated that 
“America will . . . promote programs to protect [women refugees] from 
sexual and gender-based violence.”404  Former Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice pledged that the State Department will “work with 
international partners to secure the freedom of those who are 
exploited . . . .”405  International agencies have taken concrete steps to ensure 
that the refugee arena reflects the concern with trafficking of women.406  
Most noteworthy is that former Attorney General Janet Reno set forth 
regulations that “would establish that women may comprise a social 
group.”407  The DHS, however, has failed to issue these regulations and they 
remain pending.408  Other nations have implemented asylum regulations that 
 
 398.  See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text (describing that orphans are a common 
target for recruiters of child soldiers). 
 399.  See infra Part VII. 
 400.  Knight, supra note 96, at 2. 
 401.  Id. 
 402.  Id. 
 403.  Id. 
 404.  Id. at 3. 
  405.  Id. 
 406.  Id. 
 407.  Marisa A. DeFranco, Gender Asylum: Bringing the Law into the 21st Century, 12 MASS. B. 
ASS’N SECTION REV. 1, 15 (2010), available at http://www.massbar.org/media/717503/ 
sr%20v12%20n1%20final.pdf. 
 408.  Id. 
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afford trafficked women such protection.409  It is therefore astonishing to 
note the incongruence between the words expressing commitment to protect 
victims of human trafficking and the failure of the government to do so.  
While some victims of human trafficking have been granted asylum, 
reported decisions are heavily weighted toward denials.410  These decisions 
demonstrate a firm resistance to providing asylum to victims of even the 
most severe levels of harm.411  While other forms of relief for victims of 
human trafficking exist, they are gravely inadequate to address many 
deserving victims.412 
The use of child soldiers is also a rampant problem raising grave 
humanitarian issues.  Armed forces recruit children and train them to 
commit horrific acts.413  Child soldiers are forced to engage in hazardous 
activities and live under harsh conditions with insufficient food and little or 
no access to medical care.414  Children are often told that if they do not 
follow instructions, they and their parents will be killed.415  The United 
States and forty-four other countries have recognized the prevalence of child 
recruitment and have dedicated themselves to bringing an end to the use of 
child soldiers.416  Nevertheless, within the past decade, hundreds of 
thousands of children have been killed while fighting in conflicts around the 
world.417 
This Comment has proposed three suggestions for improving United 
States asylum law as applied to victims of human trafficking and former 
child soldiers.  One proposal is for courts to acknowledge “women” as a 
social group.418  Another suggestion is for courts to allow “youth” to define a 
social group, provided a specified age range.419  Lastly, when the BIA hears 
Negusie on remand, it should find that the provisions of Fedorenko are 
applicable to asylum law, such that voluntariness should not be relevant to 
the persecutor’s bar as applied to adults, but should be a factor when applied 
to children.420  The impact of implementing these proposals not only may 
change the lives of refugees seeking protection from persecution, but may 
also have farther-reaching effects. 
 
 409.  See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
 410.  Knight, supra note 96, at 1. 
 411.  Id. 
 412.  See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text. 
 413.  Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1104. 
 414.  Child Soldiers, supra note 145.  See generally Promotion and Protection, supra note 146. 
 415.  Voices of Young Soldiers, supra note 152. 
 416.  Cepernich, supra note 153, at 1100. 
 417.  Child Soldiers, supra note 143. 
 418.  See supra notes 277–336 and accompanying text. 
 419.  See supra notes 343–54 and accompanying text. 
 420.  See supra notes 384−399 and accompanying text. 
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While critics have suggested that the repercussions of allowing gender 
as a social group may open the floodgates to countless claims, including 
fraudulent ones, a firm understanding of asylum law and international 
examples prove that this would not happen.421  Rather, only the women who 
can actually show to have suffered past persecution, or can show a well-
founded fear of future persecution, would be granted asylum.422  By 
establishing women as a proper social group, courts would be able to grant 
asylum to these victims, thereby alleviating a portion of severe persecution 
suffered throughout the world.  Every minute that courts hesitate in granting 
women social group status, women in dire need of protection are denied a 
basic human right: safety from persecution.423  While implementing the 
above suggestions may only directly affect a few people, the United States 
may serve as a leader, after which nations who do not yet have such 
provisions may follow.  By helping change this international standard, the 
United States may effectively assist victims of human trafficking applying 
for asylum in countries around the globe.  Allowing women to constitute a 
social group may also open the door for other broad groups facing 
persecution who are currently denied social group status, such as men and 
children.424  Most importantly, granting asylum to these victims may 
encourage them to provide information about their traffickers to the 
government.  Victims may be apprehensive to speak out against their 
traffickers due to the fear of reprisals if returned to their country.  If a victim 
is granted asylum, she rests assured that she will not be sent back to her 
country and may be more comfortable helping the government stop her 
traffickers.425  Helping the government locate sources of human trafficking 
allows the United States to work towards eliminating the problem 
altogether.426 
If courts recognize that “youth” qualifies as a characteristic to define a 
social group, provided a specified age range is supplied, the lives of 
countless children who risk persecution if returned to their countries may be 
 
 421.  See supra notes 287–324 and accompanying text. 
 422.  See supra notes 287–324 and accompanying text. 
 423.  Siddiqui, supra note 282, at 532. 
 424.  This may raise more concern by critics who continue to push the floodgates issue against 
women as a social group.  However, an applicant would have to prove many elements to be granted 
asylum, so not all members of these groups would be eligible.  See supra notes 287–324 and 
accompanying text.  Furthermore, even if many people were granted asylum, group size is not a 
criterion that should determine whether a group qualifies as a social group.  See supra notes 287–324 
and accompanying text. 
 425.  See supra notes 335–36 and accompanying text. 
 426.  See supra notes 400–03 and accompanying text. 
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spared.  As with allowing gender as a qualifying characteristic, allowing 
“youth” may set such a standard for other nations to follow, affording 
benefits to an even larger amount of children.  Furthermore, the fewer 
children that are sent back to countries utilizing them as soldiers, the fewer 
pawns those forces will have for inflicting persecution on third parties, 
possibly saving the lives of those third party civilians. 
Paralleling the benefits of granting social group status to women, doing 
so for children may afford them the protection needed for them to speak out 
against their persecutors.  This may allow the U.S. government to track 
down forces improperly using children as soldiers.  The repercussions of 
diminishing the use of child soldiers will affect the lives of the children who 
would be persecuted, as well as the safety of the civilians upon which the 
children may have been forced to inflict injury. 
Negusie currently awaits rehearing by the BIA to determine whether the 
persecutor’s bar applies to asylum applicants regardless of whether their 
actions were coerced.427  If the BIA holds that the persecutor’s bar still 
applies to asylum cases regardless of whether an applicant’s actions were 
voluntary, with the exception of children, it will produce a more positive 
outcome than if the persecutor’s bar applied only to applicants whose actions 
were voluntary.428  If Negusie on remand holds the persecutor’s bar applies 
only to voluntary persecution, many applicants who persecuted others, even 
voluntarily, may be granted asylum.429  While this may help applicants who 
genuinely were coerced into their actions, the potential benefit for those few 
is outweighed by the ramifications of granting asylum to those who 
voluntarily persecuted others.430  If people in other countries learn that they 
may be granted asylum in the United States despite persecuting others, they 
may have less inhibitions when confronted with a decision of whether to 
inflict persecution on others.  In addition, having engaged in persecution 
abroad, these applicants would pose a threat to the safety of citizens in the 
United States. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Julia and Amare, the hypothetical victim of human trafficking and the 
hypothetical former child soldier presented in the introduction, would likely 
be sent back to the countries in which they endured persecution.  This is 
because their respective social groups of “women” and “children” may be 
 
 427.  See supra text accompanying note 361. 
 428.  See supra notes 365–81 and accompanying text. 
 429.  See supra note 376 and accompanying text. 
 430.  See supra note 375 and accompanying text. 
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erroneously denied due to their breadth in certain circuits.431  Amare may 
also be denied asylum due to the persecutor’s bar.432   
Despite the unfortunate prevalence of human trafficking433 and the use 
of child soldiers,434 there is a void of effective regulations and asylum 
provisions to address these problems.435  Implementing the above proposals 
should ameliorate the suffering of victims of human trafficking, minimize 
the harm inherent in the use of child soldiers, as well as help prevent further 




 431.  See supra notes 189–99, 235–42, 343–45 and accompanying text.  Courts may also use two 
other unfounded grounds upon which to deny Amare’s social group of “children.”  See supra notes 
346–54 and accompanying text (describing the error of not allowing “children” to satisfy the 
particularity and immutability requirements). 
 432.  See supra notes 354–62 and accompanying text. 
 433.  See supra notes 401–12 and accompanying text. 
 434.  See supra notes 156, 225 and accompanying text (describing the United States’ 
acknowledgment that something must be done to diminish the use of child soldiers throughout the 
globe).  See also supra note 385 and accompanying text (explaining that children are especially 
vulnerable and require specialized protection). 
 435.  Congress has implemented a visa program for victims of human trafficking, but it fails to 
adequately address the problem.  See supra notes 158–64 and accompanying text. 
 436.  See supra Part VII. 
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University of California Los Angeles.  I would like to thank Judge Bruce J. Einhorn (ret.) for his 
helpful suggestions and the inspiration to write about this topic.  I would also like to thank my 
family and friends for their support throughout the writing process. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/8/2012  3:19 PM 
 
482 
*** 
 
